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FOREWORD 
This thesis is written towards the completion of the Master of Science degree in Business 
Administration at the University of Agder. The degree relates to a specialization in International 
Management. The topic of this thesis, “the influence of international ownership on the performance 
of microfinance institutions”, agrees with the subject matter of this specialization as we seek to 
establish the relationship between international ownership (presence of international shareholders) 
and the financial performance of Microfinance Institutions. In addition, the thesis identifies 
specific characteristics that are possessed by Microfinance Institutions that have international 
shareholders.  
We have included a reflective note that touches on three broader themes (i.e. internationalization, 
innovation and responsibility). These themes are essential areas for a professional in Business 
Administration today. This reflective note details how the main theme and findings of this thesis 
relate to the three broad themes of internationalization, innovation and responsibility. This 
reflective note is enclosed in appendix VI.  
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ABSTRACT 
The microfinance industry is experiencing rapid growth and financing this growth is a legitimate 
concern. During the past decade, international commercial funding in the form of international 
equity and debt has played a remarkable role in this regard. Until now, microfinance research that 
focus on the performance implications of international funding of MFIs is inadequate even though 
microfinance literature is voluminous. Our study focuses on the presence of international 
shareholders in microfinance institutions. Using data from 148 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
in 51 countries, we empirically determine MFI characteristics that relate to presence of 
international shareholders. We also investigate the influence of international shareholders on the 
overall financial performance of MFIs and operating cost. We find that 53% of MFIs that are 
shareholder owned have international shareholders. This reiterates that there is a growing 
international equity funding for MFIs and that international equity is playing a remarkable role in 
financing the rising growth of the microfinance industry.  Concerning the characteristics of MFIs, 
we find that shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders have high international 
orientation. Also, these MFIs often use village banking lending methodology, have higher outreach 
in terms of number of credit clients and usually serve urban markets. Regarding financial 
performance, we find that MFIs that have international shareholders are less profitable and less 
efficient in terms of ROE and ratio of cost to income respectively. We therefore conclude that the 
presence of international shareholders has a negative influence on overall financial performance 
of MFIs. In addition, MFIs that have international shareholders have higher operating cost profiles 
in the form of administrative and personnel costs. These findings are robust and as well, they are 
empirically and theoretically supported. The findings should however be generalized with caution. 
This is because, as literature suggests, performance improvements that result from having 
international shareholders may take time to realize and as well operating costs may be low in later 
years due to learning effects.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this master thesis, we investigate the influence of international shareholders on the overall 
financial performance and operating cost of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) as well as the 
specific characteristics of MFIs that have international shareholders. Previous microfinance 
research suggest that the type of ownership and capital structure may affect the performance of 
MFIs (Bogan, 2008; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). But does the identity and origin (local or 
international) of the shareholders matter at all? Do MFIs with international shareholders differ in 
characteristics from those without international shareholders? We are of the opinion that MFIs that 
have international shareholders may possess certain specific characteristics. Also, international 
shareholders may influence governance and operations in ways that affect performance of MFIs. 
Since 2005, there has been increasing participation of international equity investors in funding 
MFIs in many developing countries (Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). Since additional local 
funding is often inadequate or sometimes unavailable, the international equity funding window 
could be deemed necessary to contribute to the financing of the rising growth of the microfinance 
industry (Swanson, 2007). However, the coming on board of international shareholders in the 
fairly young and growing industry raises important policy and practical questions for both policy 
makers and international shareholders. For policy makers in the industry, it is imperative to ask: 
should MFIs have international shareholders at all? Do MFIs benefit in any way from having 
international shareholders? International equity investors may also have to quiz themselves if they 
provide much benefits to MFIs in which they have invested. Assaying to provide answers to these 
all-important policy questions, our study would be useful to many MFIs, policy makers in the 
microfinance industry and international equity investors in the industry. 
Our research is founded on three theories; agency theory, resource based theory and liability of 
foreignness. In the heart of the agency theory is the agency problem. This problem is commonplace 
in firms characterized by separation of ownership and management. The theory predicts that due 
to the possible divergence of the interest of owners (shareholders) and managers, firms bedeviled 
by the problem would show poor performance. In the real world, separation of ownership and 
management is inevitable in certain entities and hence good governance, which could be realized 
with the presence of international shareholders, could serve as a possible remedy to the agency 
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problem. Previous research find that foreign ownership in banks improves governance, fosters the 
imposition of governance reforms that improve performance and helps in realigning corporate 
governance practices to protect shareholders and reduce agency costs (Williams & Nguyen, 2005; 
Yoshikawa & Phan, 2001; Heugens, Van Essen & van Oosterhout, 2009; Yoshikawa & Phan, 
2003). International shareholders influence governance by securing board representation and 
through informal dialogues with management (Berger, Hasan & Zhou, 2009; Ahmadjian, 2007). 
Management is convinced of shareholders’ interests through these means (Berger et al. 2009).  
The resource based theory explains the competitive advantage of firms based on the quality, 
uniqueness and rarity of resources such firms possess. This theory predicts that generally, firms 
having superior resources would earn superior profits and elicit superior performance. 
International shareholders could be important resources (due to their capital, knowledge and 
governance skills) or even serve as links to important resources (García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 
2008; Heugens et al., 2009). They may also enhance board activities through other capabilities 
they possess such as superior risk management skills, good monitoring skills, knowledge and 
technology (Berger et al., 2009; García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 2008; Sturm & Williams, 2004; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1999; Heugens et al., 2009). Berger et al. (2009) assert that international 
shareholders usually transfer these capabilities they possess into firms in which they invest. 
Therefore, drawing on the resource based theory, we suppose that MFIs with international 
shareholders may perform better compared to their counterparts with only domestic owners.  
However, international shareholders may not influence the performance in anyway or even affect 
the same negatively due to the effect of liability of foreignness. Over the years, the theory of 
liability of foreignness has proved powerful in explaining the failure of some foreign investments 
by companies. Foreign investors in the banking industry could be plagued by liability of 
foreignness and as well, inefficiencies in foreign owned banks could be attributed to reasons of 
liability of foreignness (Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Lensink, Meesters & Naaborg, 2008). Therefore, 
based on this theory, international shareholders may influence performance negatively. The theory 
of liability of foreignness predicts an outcome which is opposite to that of resource based theory.  
In the mainstream banking industry, studies have shown that foreign ownership improves overall 
profitability and efficiency especially in terms of ROA, ROE and cost to operating income (Berger 
et al., 2009; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Bonin, Hasan & Wachtel, 2005). Improvements in governance, 
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efficiency, asset quality, and capitalization serve as the main channels through which foreign 
equity investors affect performance of banks in which they have invested (García-Herrero & 
Santabárbara, 2008; Crystal, Dages & Goldberg, 2001; Heugens et al., 2009). These improvements 
are high if the foreign owners are strategic investors (Bonin et al., 2005; Claessens & Djankov, 
1999). Also, the benefits and performance improvements from foreign ownership may take a 
longer time to realize (Williams & Nguyen, 2005). The findings of some studies however suggest 
that the mere presence of foreign owners is not important and does not affect performance but 
increasing foreign ownership and sometimes, the combination of foreign ownership and foreign 
directorship positively relates to performance of banks (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003; García-Herrero 
& Santabárbara, 2008; Choi & Hasan, 2005).  
Other studies rather find that foreign ownership and rising foreign ownership is negatively related 
to the financial performance and efficiency of banks (Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; Berger, Clarke, 
Cull, Klapper & Udell, 2005; Lensink et al., 2008; Unite & Sullivan, 2003). The negative effect 
of foreign owners is worse in countries with bad governance practices (Lensink et al., 2008). Sturm 
& Williams (2004) and Crystal, Dages & Goldberg (2002) could not find significant differences 
between the performances of banks with international owners and those without international 
owners. Overall, there is mixed evidence regarding the relationship between international 
ownership and performance in the mainstream banking industry.  
MFIs are internationalizing through investment and are also affected by other international 
influences. Mersland, Randøy and Strøm (2011) study the impact of international influence on the 
performance of MFIs and find that the internationalization of MFIs enhances social performance 
but not financial performance. Mori, Randøy & Golesorkhi, (2013) also conclude that international 
influence drives board independence in MFIs. Meanwhile board independence could lead to better 
performance in MFIs (Hartarska, 2005). According to Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) MFIs’ access 
to international commercial debt relates to performance. What about access to international equity? 
Since international debt and equity are both foreign funding sources for MFIs, we are of the 
opinion that the presence of international shareholders may influence performance. Many other 
microfinance research investigate the relationship between other MFI characteristics and board 
mechanisms and performance (e.g. Galema, Lensink & Mersland 2012; Hartarska & Mersland, 
2012; Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Mori, Golesorkhi, Randøy & Hermes, 2015). To the best of our 
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knowledge, the question pertaining to the influence of international equity on MFIs’ performance 
and the MFI characteristics that relate to having international shareholders remain unanswered in 
the microfinance literature. We fill this literature gap by examining the influence of international 
shareholders on the financial performance of MFIs. As well, we assess specific characteristics of 
MFIs which relate to having international shareholders. 
In this study, we answer the following research questions:  
1. What are the characteristics of MFIs that have international shareholders? 
2. How does the presence of international shareholders influence overall financial 
performance and operating cost of MFIs? 
We deem it important to answer the above research questions for two reasons. First, we fill the 
identified literature vacuum and add to existing microfinance literature that examine the effect of 
internationalization and foreign funding on MFIs’ performance. Second, we provide empirical 
evidence on the influence of international equity on the financial performance of MFIs. This is 
because, the participation of international equity investors in financing MFIs may have 
implications for their financial performance. We find it interesting to examine the financial 
performance implications when MFIs have international shareholders.  
We use data from 148 MFIs in 51 emerging and developing countries. The data is generated from 
risk assessment reports prepared by 5 rating agencies (i.e. MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, 
Crisil and M-Cril). The reports are from 1998 to 2012 with the majority from 2004 to 2008. Since 
all the rating agencies are approved by Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), we deem 
the data reliable.  
In the data, there are two independent samples: shareholder MFIs that have international 
shareholders and those that do not have international shareholders. The main variable of the study 
is the dummy variable for international shareholder.  Analyzing the data, we first employ two 
univariate statistical techniques, t-test and χ2 test to compare the respective means and medians of 
the independent samples contained in the data. Subsequently, we carry out multiple regression 
analysis using Random Effects (RE) Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and logistic regression 
panel data models. We also employ the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity using the two-
stage least squares instrumental variable method. Whiles a good instrument is difficult to find, we 
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follow previous literature by employing lagged values of the independent variable as instruments 
(Lee, 2014; Owen & Yu, 2008; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995).  
We find that 53% of MFIs that are shareholder owned have international shareholders. This 
confirms that there is growing international equity funding for MFIs and that international equity 
is playing a remarkable role in financing the rising growth of the microfinance industry. Exploring 
the characteristics of MFIs, we find that shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders 
have high international orientation as these MFIs are more often affiliated to international 
networks, have internationalized boards, international CEOs and have been initiated by 
international actors. Also, these MFIs often use village banking lending methodology, have higher 
outreach in terms of number of credit clients and usually serve urban markets. MFIs that have 
international shareholders and those that do not have international shareholders have other 
organizational characteristics in common such as focus on women and regulation by banking 
authorities. Regarding financial performance, we find that MFIs that have international 
shareholders are less profitable and less efficient in terms of ROE and ratio of cost to income 
respectively. We therefore conclude that the presence of international shareholders has a negative 
influence on overall financial performance of MFIs. In addition, MFIs that have international 
shareholders have higher operating cost profiles in the form of administrative and personnel costs. 
Our findings are robust and as well, they are empirically and theoretically supported. The findings 
should however be generalized with caution. This is because as literature suggests performance 
improvements that result from having international shareholders may take time to realize and as 
well operating costs may be low in later years due to learning effects.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two deals with the relevance of the study. 
In chapter three, we discuss the various theories that underpin our research. We also present 
previous empirical findings and the conceptual framework. Chapter four focuses on the description 
of the data. Chapter five presents the research methodology. Here we document all the methods 
and procedures that are employed to analyze the data. The findings of the data analysis is presented 
in chapter six. Chapter seven is dedicated to the discussion of the findings. Finally, chapter eight 
covers the summary of findings, conclusion, implications and recommendations for future studies. 
We also present the limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to the background and relevance of the study. We present the motivation 
and the main justification of the study. We touch on relevant issues in the microfinance industry, 
the growing international funding in the industry and finally the gap in microfinance research 
which we assay to fill with this thesis. 
 
2.1 The Global Microfinance Industry 
Microfinance refers to the “means and institutions created in order to provide financial services to 
people excluded from traditional banking” (Labie & Mersland, 2011, p. 284). Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) which are also referred to as Microbanks (Mersland et al., 2011) are the 
institutions which are in the business of providing banking services to poor clients (Hartarska & 
Mersland, 2012; Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Microfinance was thrust into the limelight in 
2006 when the noble peace prize was awarded to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank 
(Mersland et al., 2011; Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010) as well as the United Nations declaration 
of 2005 as “the year of Microcredit” (Mersland & Strøm., 2009; Galema et al., 2012). Microfinance 
has therefore attracted significant interest and attention both nationally and internationally (Labie 
& Mersland, 2011). According to Labie & Mersland (2011), most MFIs have their roots in Credit 
unions, NGOs and public bank restructurings. In a research by Mersland & Urgeghe (2013, p. 17), 
they argue that “the provision of microfinance services to poor families and micro-entrepreneurs 
has evolved to become a global industry during the recent decade”. This means that there is a 
souring growth in microfinance activities across the globe. In figure 2.1 below, we demonstrate 
the growth of the MFI industry in terms of number of borrowers. From 13 million people in 1997, 
MFIs were serving more than 200 million people in 2013, most of which are poor borrowers as 
evident in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Growth of borrowers (total borrowers and total poorest borrowers) 
 
Source: State of the microcredit summit campaign report 2015 by Reed (2015) 
 
Buttressing this, the ResponsAbility (2016, p. 4) has forecasted that “the developments and growth 
trends across the major microfinance markets across the globe in 2016 is expected to be as follows: 
10-15% growth is expected in the global market, around 30% growth  is expected in the Asia 
Pacific, 15-20% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 10-15% in Middle-East and North Africa, around 10% in 
Eastern Europe, 5-10% in Latin America and 0-10% in Central Asia and Caucasus”. This is 
depicted in the figure below: 
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Figure 2.2: Forecasted annual growth in the global microfinance industry 
 
Source: Microfinance Market Outlook (p. 4) by ResponAbility (2016) 
 
The high growth expectation in the industry deepens and underscores the growing importance of 
MFIs in the countries in which they operate. These countries are usually emerging and developing 
economies. According to ResponsAbility (2016, p. 8), the major microfinance markets include 
“India, Cambodia, Kenya, Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Mongolia, Paraguay, Costa Rica, 
Tajikistan, Armenia, Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Ecuador”. This may be due to the very nature 
of the activities of MFIs of providing financial services to small enterprises, table top vendors, 
micro entrepreneurs and other poor borrowers which are common in these countries. The observed 
growth in the microfinance industry seems resilient and sustainable. This assertion is justified by 
the high GDP growth in economies with large microfinance markets. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
observed and forecasted GDP growth rates of 15 most important microfinance economies and 
developed countries. As evident in the figure, whiles advanced economies are showing a relatively 
slower GDP growth, microfinance economies are showing high and robust GDP growths. This 
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highlights the resilience of the industry. Given the importance, growth and sound prospects of the 
industry, we deem research in microfinance justifiable and worthwhile. 
 
Figure 2.3: GDP growth rates of advanced economies and 15 most important microfinance 
economies 
 
Source: Microfinance Market Outlook (p. 13) by ResponAbility (2016) 
 
2.2 Microfinance and International funding 
MFIs are usually the basic banks serving the poor in the countries in which they operate, the 
emerging and developing countries (some of which are mentioned in the preceding section). 
Owing to this, one would expect these institutions to be nationally or locally owned. However, due 
to the relative growing economic importance of these MFIs or the countries in which they operate, 
MFIs are attracting international investors and hence owners as well. At the initial stages of the 
development, MFIs were primarily Non-profit establishments supported by donations, grants and 
subsidies (Dieckmann, Speyer, Ebling & Walter, 2007). Today, the microfinance industry has 
grown significantly and broken grounds into new segments and even “into a more commercialized 
industry” (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). Owing to these developments, the landscape of 
Microfinance activities has evolved including its funding. MFIs are now financed by a mix of 
“donations, equity capital, borrowings and deposits” and foreign or international funding has 
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increased since 2005 – thanks to Microfinance Investment Vehicles (Lützenkirchen and 
Weistroffer, 2012). According to the Microfinance Market outlook of 2016, experts believe that 
international funding (which comprises of both debt and equity) would be one of the important 
funding sources for MFIs in the coming years. The diagram below gives credence to this assertion. 
We opine that increasing international participation in the funding of MFIs will have great 
implications on their performance. Hence, the core theme of this paper. 
 
 Figure 2.4: Important funding sources projected for the next three years 
 
Source: Microfinance Market Outlook (p. 24) by ResponAbility (2016) 
 
An international shareholder in an MFI may be imperative if such an investor brings in new 
knowledge and experiences that enhance performance of the MFI. There could also be an instance 
where there is a gap in knowledge between MFI banking system and that of the mainstream or 
regular banking. In such a case, new knowledge by an international shareholder may bridge such 
a gap and hence increase the operational efficiency of MFIs. International shareholders could also 
serve as important links to resources and capital as well as international networks. In another sense, 
international shareholders may bring on board their experience and other governance enhancing 
skills that improves monitoring and hence reducing the agency cost while fostering performance. 
However, obviously, international shareholders are not nationals of the country in which the MFI 
is operating. There are therefore higher tendencies for their efforts to be militated against by 
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liability of foreignness. This is most likely if there are differences in culture, language, norms and 
values between the home country of the international shareholder and the country in which the 
MFI is operating. In the dataset for this research, most of the international investors are from 
western countries (see table 4.2), whose culture and way of life are largely different from 
developing countries where most MFIs operate. In such a scenario, the presence of an international 
investor or shareholder may not have any influence or would even impact negatively on the 
performance of the microfinance institution. One may therefore legitimately ask: is it worthwhile 
for MFIs to have international shareholders? Based on our evidence, we provide answer to this 
question by examining the influence of international shareholding (or ownership) on the financial 
performance of MFIs. This is the main objective of this thesis. 
 
2.3 Microfinance research 
Microfinance research that focuses on governance and performance in microfinance institutions 
remains scanty and underdeveloped (Galema et al., 2012). The existing ones have considered the 
relationship that exists between various governance mechanisms and MFI performance (See 
Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013; Mersland et al., 2011; Galema et al., 2012; 
Hartarska & Mersland, 2012; Mersland & Strøm, 2008) whiles others focused on capital structure 
(Bogan, 2008) and board structure (Mori et al., 2015; Mori et al., 2013). To the best of our 
knowledge, despite the growing international equity investment in MFIs, no study has yet 
considered the relationship between international shareholding and MFI performance neither has 
there been a study about the characteristics of MFIs that relate to presence of international 
shareholders even though such studies are very common in traditional firms as well as the banking 
industry. This is a vacuum in the microfinance literature. International funding for Microfinance 
institutions has developed into a growing specialized global market attracting investors of diverse 
profit seeking motives (ResponsAbility, 2016; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). The analysis of 
Galema et al. (2012, p. 720) in a way reaffirmed previous appeals for the transformation of 
Microfinance NGOs “into regulated, shareholding, ﬁnancial intermediaries”. It is likely for these 
MFIs to appeal to international equity investors when this transformation occurs.  
Also, predictions by experts suggest that international funding (which includes international 
equity) through Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) would remain an important source of 
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funding for MFIs for the coming years (ResponsAbility, 2016; Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 
2012). We are of the opinion that international shareholders may influence the performance of 
MFIs in various ways. Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) find that MFIs’ access to international debt 
relates to performance and the findings of Bogan (2008) also suggest that the capital structure of 
MFIs matter. Therefore, if capital structure matters, then it may also matter who owns the equity 
in Microfinance institutions, and if access to international debt relates to performance, then access 
to international equity may relate to performance as well. Drawing on agency theory, liability of 
foreignness and resource based theory, we examine the influence of international shareholders on 
the financial performance of MFIs in order to fill the research vacuum and to contribute to 
literature. We accomplish this using data on 148 MFIs from 51 emerging and developing countries. 
Our study is useful to academia as it contributes to the ongoing microfinance research. Policy 
makers of MFIs that have international shareholders and those considering to raise capital through 
international equity would also find it useful and interesting. It is also useful to international equity 
investors in the microfinance industry. 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
The microfinance industry is growing and expected to experience further growths. International 
funding could be the available means of financing the trending growth as local funding may be 
insufficient or even unavailable in extreme situations. There is therefore increasing international 
participation in financing MFIs and experts believe that international equity would be among the 
most important funding sources for MFIs in the coming years. This trend may have implications 
for the operations and the general performance of MFIs.  
Meanwhile even though microfinance literature is voluminous, no study has yet examined the 
influence of international ownership on the performance of MFIs, to the best of our knowledge. 
No study has also considered the characteristics of MFIs that relate to having international 
shareholders. Our research is therefore relevant in two ways. Firstly, we fill the identified literature 
vacuum and add to existing microfinance literature. Secondly, we provide empirical evidence on 
the influence of international equity on the financial performance of MFIs.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the relevance and background of this study and hence highlighted 
the need to find answers to the research questions. In this chapter, we present the basic and core 
theories that underlie this paper. We also present the findings of prior research and subsequently 
formulate the research hypotheses. Finally, we illustrate the conceptual framework in a model. 
 
3.1 Core and basic theories 
In this section, we present the core theories for this research. The core theories: corporate 
governance, agency theory, resource based theory and liability of foreignness are discussed in 
turns below: 
 
3.1.1 Meaning and definition of corporate governance 
Corporate governance has been variously defined by scholars with different views. To Johnson, 
Boone, Breach & Friedman (2000, p. 142), corporate governance means “the effectiveness of 
mechanisms that minimize agency conflicts involving managers, with particular emphasis on the 
legal mechanisms that prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders”. The definition 
emphasizes rights of minority stockholders and the role of law, rules and regulations in the same 
way as Gillan and Starks (1998) who rather defined corporate governance from the general 
corporate operations perspective without focusing on any stakeholder.  According to Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997, p. 737), “corporate  governance  deals  with  the  ways  in  which  suppliers  of  
finance  to corporations  assure  themselves  of getting  a  return  on  their  investment”. In this 
light, Hartarska (2005, p.1628) explained governance in microfinance as “the mechanisms through 
which donors, equity investors, and other providers of funds ensure themselves that their funds 
will be used according to the intended purposes”. In this definition she specifies the key suppliers 
of finance to MFIs. Governance mechanisms can be internal or external. In MFIs, “internal 
governance factors are those related to the MFI’s board and include its size, representations by 
various stakeholders and managerial capture whiles external factors account for the weak market-
disciplining mechanisms in microfinance, such as a lack of private shareholders, the limited role 
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of competition, and differences in regulation” (Hartarska & Mersland, 2012, p. 219). As we would 
see later, good governance that could be made possible with having international shareholders is a 
remedy to the overarching problem of governance (agency problem). 
 
3.1.2 Agency theory 
Governance problems are universal and exist in business organizations of various forms and types 
such as corporations, large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofit firms (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983a; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Thomsen, 2008) and may explain the differences 
between the performance of different firms with different ownership (Williams & Nguyen, 2005). 
Agency problems are prevalent in the governance of firms characterized by the separation of 
ownership and management (control) (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Williams & Nguyen, 2005; 
Thomsen, 2008).   
This phenomenon has a rather long history. Adam Smith, in his book, “The wealth of Nations”, 
observed that “the  directors  of  such  companies,  however,  being  the managers  rather  of other  
people’s  money  than  of  their  own,  it  cannot  well  be expected,  that  they  should watch  over  
it  with  the  same  anxious  vigilance  with  which  the  partners  in  a  private copartnery  frequently  
watch  over  their  own.  Like  the stewards  of  a  rich  man,  they  are apt  to  consider  attention  
to  small  matters  as not  for  their  master’s  honour,  and  very easily  give  themselves a  
dispensation  from  having  it.  Negligence  and  profusion,  therefore,  must  always  prevail,  more  
or  less,  in  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  such  a company” (Smith & Garnier, 1838, P. 
311). Therefore, the agency problem seems to be the basic problem of governance in firms 
(Thomsen, 2008). 
Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 308) defined an agency relationship  as  “a  contract  under  which  
one  or  more persons  (the  principal(s))  engage  another  person  (the  agent)  to  perform  some 
service  on  their  behalf  which  involves  delegating  some decision  making  authority to  the  
agent”. According to the theory, the interest of the principal and that of the agent could diverge 
and hence the likelihood for the agent to engage in self-seeking ventures rather than protecting and 
upholding the interest of the principal (Hill & Jones, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b; Thomsen, 2008). In corporations and other firms, the relationship between owners 
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(stockholders) and managers fits the definition of agency, with managers being agents and owners 
(shareholders) being principals (Thomsen, 2008).  
Good governance is often deemed as an antidote to the agency problem (Thomsen, 2008). Foreign 
share ownership improves governance (Williams & Nguyen, 2005) and also serves as an effective 
medium for the imposition of governance reforms (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003) that lead to superior 
performance. Yoshikawa and Phan (2001) argue that increasing foreign ownership is helpful in 
realigning corporate governance practices to those that protect shareholders and hence reducing 
the agency problem. Khanna & Palepu (1999) stressed that foreign institutional investors possess 
good monitoring skills that improve corporate governance. Therefore, firms having foreign 
institutional investors would exhibit superior performance.  Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009, p. 
16-17) opine that “foreign equity owners enhance monitoring activity and inﬂuence management 
to adopt more efﬁcient strategic and operational practices”. In this regard, Heugens et al., (2009) 
assert that foreign shareholders contribute to the profitability of the firms in which they invest by 
helping those firms to realize good governance practices. Berger et al. (2009) observe that foreign 
shareholders secure board seats to improve corporate governance and to convince managers of 
protecting shareholders’ interest. The presence of foreign shareholders could therefore potentially 
align the interest of managers and that of shareholders thereby reducing the agency problems 
between shareholders and managers. Contrary, García-Herrero & Santabárbara (2008) find that 
foreign shareholders having a seat on the board does not improve performance as Berger et al., 
(2009) claim.  
The cost associated with these mechanisms is the so-called, agency cost (Shapiro, 2005; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). These costs therefore include; “the monitoring  expenditures  by  the principal, 
the  bonding  expenditures  by  the  agent, and the  residual  loss” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 
308). According to Fama & Jensen (1983b), agency cost is the price paid by open corporations for 
the advantages that accrue to them as a result of using unrestricted stock. Elsewhere, agency cost 
is described as inefficiency (Williams & Nguyen, 2005). Since available literature suggest that 
foreign ownership is associated with efficiency in the banking industry (E.g. Berger et al., 2009; 
Lin & Zhang, 2009; Bonin et al., 2005), foreign ownership could reduce agency cost significantly 
and boost performance. 
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3.1.3 Resource Based Theory (RBT) 
The Resource Based Theory (RBT) is rather deeply rooted in explaining the sources of sustained 
competitive advantage of firms (Barney, 2001). Thus the theory assays to offer explanation as to 
why some firms consistently outperform other firms. In the heart of the theory is the argument that 
organizational resources and capabilities underpin competitive advantage rather than the 
organization’s strategy, industry factors or the broader business environment (Barney, 1991). Also, 
firms with relatively superior resources are those that earn higher profits (Peteraf, 1993). By 
definition, resources in a firm are tangible or intangible in nature and include; “brand  names,  in-
house  knowledge  of  technology, employment  of  skilled  personnel,  trade  contacts,  machinery,  
efficient  procedures,  capital, capabilities, general organizational procedures, firm attributes, 
information and knowledge” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172; Barney, 1991, p. 101). The resources of a 
firm that achieve a sustainable competitive advantage in the long run are those that are valuable, 
difficult to replicate, rare in nature and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991; Hart, 1995). Hall (1992) 
emphasized the importance of intangible assets (such as employees’ know-how, patents and 
license) for a sustainable competitive edge. The resource based theory is widely researched in the 
strategic management literature and as well, it is applied in microfinance research (for example, 
see; Mersland et al, 2011).   
The resource based theory has been of interest in writing this paper as international shareholders 
possess knowledge and international experience that may be important to the governance and 
business of MFIs. MFIs that have international shareholders possess an important resource, access 
to external capital (García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 2008; Heugens et al., 2009). Such international 
shareholders may also possess governance enhancing capabilities that improve monitoring and the 
general activities of the board such as superior risk management skills, good monitoring skills, 
knowledge and technology (Berger et al., 2009; García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 2008; Sturm & 
Williams, 2004; Khanna & Palepu, 1999). According to Heugens et al. (2009), foreign 
shareholders contribute to firm performance by enhancing managerial capability through the 
provision of knowledge and organizational resources. Berger et al. (2009) observe that foreign 
shareholders transfer these capabilities into firms in which they invest to improve efficiency and 
performance. However, being international shareholders, they originate from countries other than 
the country in which the respective MFIs operate. Owing to this, they could have difficulties in 
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leveraging their competences into MFIs due to differences in culture and general norm systems. 
In light of this, we discuss the theory that deals with this phenomenon, liability of foreignness, in 
the next section.  
 
3.1.4 Liability of foreignness 
Liability of foreignness is often conceived as cost and other disadvantages associated with 
international investment and interaction with variables within the international business climate 
(Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). It is the result of differences that exist between countries such as 
spatial distance, complex local business environment, discrimination against foreigners, 
restrictions from one’s home country as well as host country government policies which favour 
natives (but not expatriate investors) (Zaheer, 1995; Mezias, 2002). Prior research has also stressed 
the explanatory ability of national culture differences to liability of foreignness (See Mezias, Chen, 
Murphy, Biaggio, Chuawanlee, Hui, Okumura, and Starr, 2002). Calhoun (2002) opines that 
culture manifestations in the international business environment could be by formal or informal 
means. He indicates that whiles difficulty in understanding the formal manifestations (usually 
laws, rules and regulations) could be a source of liability of foreignness, their impact is minimal 
as formal documentation and descriptions are equally available to natives and foreigners. Hence 
the informal manifestations of culture (usually codified in norms, practices and procedures) serve 
as the greatest source of liability of foreignness (Calhoun, 2002). Miller & Parkhe (2002) provide 
evidence of liability of foreignness in the banking industry in the same manner as it manifests in 
other industries. Owing to reasons of liability of foreignness, Lensink et al. (2008) find that foreign 
ownership in banks is associated with inefficiency. We therefore argue that foreign investors and 
for that matter international equity holders in the microfinance industry would suffer liability of 
foreignness alike. As liability of foreignness is associated with poor profitability (Lu & Beamish, 
2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Zaheer 1995), MFIs that have international shareholders may show 
low performance compared with those that do not have international shareholders. 
Meanwhile liability of foreignness varies with time (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997) and is strongest 
during the initial period of interaction with the foreign investment (Lu & Beamish, (2001). In 
effect, liability of foreignness may reduce in later years perhaps due to familiarization with the 
foreign environment or through learning (Petersen & Pedersen, 2002). The role of knowledge in 
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minimizing liability of foreignness is highlighted here. International shareholders therefore can 
minimize the ill-effects of liability of foreignness through pre-investment and post-investment 
learning and acquisition of knowledge of the foreign investment climate. 
 
3.2 Empirical findings of previous research 
 
3.2.1 Typical characteristics of MFIs 
Typically, MFIs possess diverse characteristics in terms of size, age, markets they serve, lending 
methodology, among others. According to Mersland & Strøm (2012a), a typical MFI is relatively 
small in terms of number of credit clients, loan portfolios, number of employees and average loan 
size. Also, these authors observe that the typical MFI employs collective lending methodology 
(such as solidarity group lending) and targets women clients. Regarding targeting of women 
clients, D’espallier, Guérin & Mersland (2011) find that the characteristics of MFIs that relate to 
focus on women include; use of group lending methodology, international orientation, small 
average loan size and non-commercial legal status. Generally group lending seems to be a hallmark 
and a largely shared characteristic among MFIs (Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010). Studies have shown that the widespread use of group lending methodology in the 
industry is due to the joint liability and high repayments that characterize group loans (Armendáriz 
& Morduch, 2010). However, among the MFIs studied by Mersland & Strøm (2012a), the 
repayment rates associated with group and individual loans do not vary much. As stated by 
Mersland & Strøm (2012b), another overarching characteristic of MFIs is focus on poor clients 
and this is highlighted in the granting of smaller loans. They further note that whiles few MFIs 
serve more than 400,000 clients, the average MFI serves fewer than 4,000 clients. Also MFIs are 
characterized by high lending rates to their customers. This is done to cater for the high operating 
cost that is associated with granting smaller loans. Additionally, Mersland & Strøm (2012a) 
observe that most characteristics (e.g. size and age) are diverse among MFIs. They attribute the 
wide diversity to the young nature of the industry and the fact that MFIs are at different stages of 
development and are also domestically established in diverse contexts. The characteristics of the 
MFIs in the dataset employed for this study are presented in chapter four (under section 4.3). 
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3.2.2 International shareholders and performance in the banking industry 
Empirical findings in the banking literature show mixed evidence regarding the relationship 
between international or foreign ownership and performance. Yoshikawa & Phan, (2003) find that 
an increase of foreign ownership in banks leads to improvement in ROA and RI (Stock Return 
Index). García-Herrero & Santabárbara (2008) report similar findings. They further assert that 
improvements in efficiency, asset quality, and capitalization are the main channels for the positive 
impacts of foreign shareholders’ presence. Also, according to these authors, corporate governance 
improvements play a key role in realizing the benefits of foreign ownership and hence stressed on 
the strict incorporation of corporate governance provisions into contracts between firms and their 
foreign investors. These findings however contradict the main findings of Lensink & Naaborg 
(2007). The latter find that rising foreign ownership in banks rather negatively affects performance. 
They observe that banks having a lower foreign stake perform better than those with higher foreign 
stake. Some other studies also reveal the poor performance and inefficiency associated with 
foreign ownership in banks (Berger et al., 2005; Lensink et al., 2008). Lensink et al. (2008) add 
that the negative effect is relatively low in countries with good governance and worst in countries 
plagued with bad governance.  
Berger et al. (2009) report that minority foreign ownership in banks improves both profit and cost 
efficiency. They also observe that performance improves after foreign investment. Berger et al. 
(2009) further document mechanisms employed by foreign shareholders to increase efficiency. 
First, foreign shareholders secure board positions to improve governance in firms they have 
invested. Such board representation may lead to board independence, increased knowledge, board 
expertise, efficient monitoring, performance improvements and a reduction in the agency cost 
(Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009; Choi & Hasan, 2005). Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009, p. 16) 
observe that “foreign board members’ independence appears to play an important role in the 
corporate orientation and internal cost management of domestic banks”. Meanwhile the findings 
of García-Herrero & Santabárbara (2008) seem to show that having a seat on the board is just 
nominal and does not present any advantage to foster performance. Other mechanisms reported by 
Berger et al. (2009) include the conscious transfer of performance-enhancing skills, knowledge, 
superior technology and contribution to the training of employees (see also García-Herrero & 
Santabárbara, 2008). Lin & Zhang (2009) find that international ownership in Chinese banks 
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improves profitability and efficiency especially in terms of ROA and Cost to operating income 
(COI). On this basis they contend for further ownership reforms in Chinese banks. Bonin et al. 
(2005) contend that presence of a strategic foreign owner improves cost efficiency but not profit 
efficiency. They also find a higher average ROE for banks with majority government holding than 
for foreign owned banks 
Overall, Crystal et al. (2001) conclude that foreign owned banks show higher financial strength 
relative to locally owned banks. In addition, they opine that foreign owned banks institute 
aggressive mechanisms to guard against asset quality deterioration and are also willing to forgo 
short term profitability to guarantee long term soundness. This could reasonably suggest that 
foreign ownership in banks promotes long term financial soundness and stability. In line with this 
long term perspective, Williams & Nguyen (2005) report that the governance, profitability and 
efficiency improvements that accompany the presence of foreign shareholders take a longer time 
to realize. Sturm & Williams (2004) find that foreign owned banks do not exhibit superior 
performance compared to locally owned banks. However, foreign owned banks show strength in 
technological and scale efficiency and are characterized by aggressive response to asset quality 
and a stronger loan growth potential (Crystal et al., 2002). According to Khanna & Palepu (1999), 
foreign institutional owners are good monitors and that their presence is often related to superior 
performance. They stress the role of foreign institutional ownership in enhancing good governance 
and performance. The results of Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009) show that “the presence of 
foreign equity and board members forces banks to re-orient their corporate strategy and reduce 
operating and total costs”. Given such cost reduction, performance and efficiency improvements 
are likely. Regarding the finding relating to operating cost, Unite & Sullivan (2003) suggest 
otherwise. 
Choi & Hasan (2005) find that the mere existence of a foreign shareholder in a bank is not 
important. However, an increase in foreign ownership combined with the presence of foreign 
directorship improves performance significantly in terms of returns and risk. Finally, there is 
empirical evidence that ownership concentration is an able mechanism for enhancing good 
governance and fostering performance and efficiency (Pivovarsky, 2003; McConnell & Servaes, 
1990). Available evidence from the banking literature however suggests that performance 
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improvements are well pronounced when ownership is concentrated in the hands of foreigners and 
especially foreign strategic investors (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Heugens et al., 2009). 
 
3.2.3 Internationalization, Governance and performance of MFIs 
“Professionalization and commercialization of MFIs have provided the basis for growth and 
prosperity of the microfinance industry” (Lützenkirchen et al., 2012, p. 9). According to 
Lützenkirchen et al. (2012, p. 9), the volume of assets of MFIs grew 35% on average yearly and 
as a result, MFIs were seen “by many as a secure and profitable investment opportunity”. This 
rapid growth inevitably requires funding which is relatively difficult to obtain internally from local 
sources. In the paper “The Role of International Capital Markets in Microfinance”, Swanson 
(2007, p. 2) noted that “domestic emerging country commercial banks, which should be major 
funding sources for MFIs, are typically averse to lending to them. Moreover, capital markets in 
most developing countries are thin and the major institutional players are averse to or legally 
constrained from significant investment in microfinance. For these reasons, it is unlikely that 
domestic sources in emerging countries will generate more than a fraction of the more than $200 
billion that will need to be raised to satisfy potential demand”. International funding therefore 
could be the only means to finance the souring growth of the microfinance industry.  
In recent times, there has been increasing pressure from donors in favour of financial sustainability. 
This pressure together with the rapid growth of the microfinance industry has propelled MFIs to 
turn to international sources for funding (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). In essence, international 
capital markets are instrumental for providing the necessary funding for supporting the growth in 
the microfinance industry. In 2010, MFIs enjoyed US$ 13 billion as direct investment from 
international investors in the form of equity and debt (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer, 2012). This 
and the studies by Mersland et al. (2011) and Mersland & Urgeghe (2013) provide evidence that 
MFIs are internationalizing through investment. Generally, in literature that focus on multinational 
firms, there is evidence that internationalization leads to better company performance (Tallman 
and Li, 1996). Mersland et al. (2011) specifically find that such form of internationalization 
(through investments) exerts a positive influence on the social performance of Microfinance 
institutions but not on financial performance.  
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Some studies have also examined the relationship between international governance mechanisms 
and performance of microfinance institutions.  Mersland, & Strøm (2009) examine the relationship 
that exists between governance and performance using a dataset comprising of 278 MFIs from 60 
countries. They find that an international director on the board does not improve performance. This 
suggests that international shareholders who secure board position may do so to the peril of 
performance of the MFI in which they have invested. Some later studies also find partly similar 
results that international directorship negatively affects financial performance but enhances social 
performance (Mersland et al, 2011; Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2012). This is somewhat contrary to 
the findings of Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) and a recent study by Mori et al. (2015) which provide 
evidence that internationalization of boards is associated with better company performance and 
firm value and signals positively to the capital market.  
Hartarska (2005) studies the relationship between governance mechanisms and the performance 
of MFIs in Eastern and Central Europe as well the Newly Independent States. Based on data from 
three surveys conducted in the years 1998, 2001 and 2002 respectively, she finds that there is “a 
tradeoff between MFI outreach and sustainability depending on stakeholder representation on the 
board”. An independent board seems crucial for good governance and performance (Hartarska, 
2005). Mori et al. (2015) also encourage board independence to trigger better performance of 
MFIs. Such level of board independence in MFIs can be achieved through international influence 
(Mori et al., 2013) and when foreign investors are present (Ahmadjian, 2007). Mersland & 
Urgeghe (2013) investigate the relationship between international funding through debt and the 
performance of MFIs. They find that MFIs access to international commercial funding is strongly 
related to performance.  
 
3.2.4 Internationalization, Liability of foreignness and performance 
There is evidence in internationalization literature that firms venturing abroad meet disadvantages 
and are faced with liability of foreignness in the form of additional costs as compared to their 
domestic counterparts. (Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). This concept was first studied by Hymer 
(1976, p.34) who noted that “national firms have the general advantage of better information about 
their country: its economy, its language, its law, and its politics”. He further noted that “To a 
foreigner, the cost of acquiring this information may be considerable” (Hymer, 1976, p. 34).  
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Zaheer coined the term liability of foreignness, to refer to “all additional costs a firm operating in 
a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer 1995, p. 343). She argues that 
these costs arise due to spatial distance between the parent and subsidiary companies impacting 
coordination, due to cultural, political and economic differences, and foreign companies’ 
unfamiliarity with the environment (Zaheer 1995). This is partly similar to Bell, Filatotchev and 
Rasheed (2012, p. 107) who study liability of foreignness in the capital market and identified 
“institutional distance, information asymmetry, unfamiliarity and cultural differences as the 
sources of liability of foreignness in capital markets”. 
Liability of foreignness has been considerably studied in literature. In their study, Zaheer & 
Mosakowski (1997) find that liability of foreignness exists in foreign currency trading rooms 
which they found to have a lower survival rate than local trading rooms and that it varies over time 
i.e. declines with time and increasing deregulation. Prior to that, Zaheer (1995) asserts that liability 
of foreignness makes foreign trading rooms less profitable than the local ones. This is attributed 
to the fact that the local rooms have much easier, timely and cheaper access to the host country 
information. Similarly, Miller & Parkhe (2002, p. 66) study liability of foreignness in the banking 
industry but on a firm level rather than departmental level as the case for Zaheer and Mosakowski 
(1997) and find that “on average foreign-owned banks are less X-efficient than host country banks” 
providing evidence for a liability of foreignness.  
Liability of foreignness impacts on foreign investment decisions (Baik, Kang, Kim, & Lee, 2013) 
as well as market entry strategies (Chen, Griffith & Hu, 2006). It is strongest during the initial 
stages of internationalization and is often associated with poor corporate performance (Lu & 
Beamish, 2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Zaheer, 1995). Microfinance literature is voluminous 
(Galema et al., 2012) and many studies have delved into the internationalization of MFIs. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, empirical evidence of the influence of liability of 
foreignness on the growing internationalization and performance of MFIs is yet to be found and 
made available. Nonetheless, liability of foreignness can have the same influence on the 
microfinance industry as it has on other industries.  
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3.3 Research hypotheses 
In this subsection, we present our research hypotheses. 
 
3.3.1 International Shareholders and MFI characteristics.  
Various studies in microfinance have shown that internationalization through investment and 
international influence enhance social performance of MFIs (Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland & 
Urgeghe, 2013; Mori et al., 2015). International players in the microfinance industry therefore 
seem to promote social goals in MFIs. For example, a typical social set up indicator, focus on 
women has characterized MFIs since the inception of the industry and is often backed by 
international players in the industry (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b; D'espallier et al., 2013). We 
therefore predict the following relationship: 
H1: MFIs that have international shareholders have higher social set-up 
Most countries have regulations that govern the mainstream banking sector. However, little 
provision is made for MFIs. In their paper, Hartarska & Nadolnyak (2007) note that laws and 
regulations that cater for the Microfinance industry are usually driven by large microfinance 
networks. These networks are composed of international organizations like World vision, 
Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), ACCION International that are 
actively involved in the financing of the microfinance industry with equity funds (Norell, Emory-
Smith & Bruett, 2003). International shareholders, being unfamiliar with the environment in which 
they wish to invest are more likely to prefer a regulated environment as this may make them feel 
that their investments are secure. In view of this, we expect that international shareholders will 
have a higher presence in regulated than unregulated MFIs and hence we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: MFIs that have international shareholders are more regulated than their counterparts that 
have only domestic ownership. 
International influences on the microfinance industry include membership to an international 
network, initiation by international actors, international board membership, international CEO 
among others (Mersland et al., 2011) We opine that these influences are likely to improve the 
publicity and reputation of MFIs internationally and hence make those MFIs appeal to other 
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international actors such as international equity investors. Stated differently, we are of the opinion 
that MFIs that have appealed to other international actors are likely to appeal to international equity 
investors as well. Available evidence even suggests that the international networks also invest 
equity funds in MFIs (Norell et al., 2003). We therefore expect that: 
H3: MFIs that have international shareholders are characterized by high international orientation. 
MFIs adopt collective lending methodologies such as solidarity group lending and village banking 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2012). These collective lending methods have foreign or international origin. 
For example: group lending was founded by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in addition to ACCION 
International in Latin America (Ledgerwood, 2014) whiles village banking was pioneered by 
FINCA (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2006). Owing to the fact that they were pioneered by 
international organizations that are highly involved in the microfinance industry including funding, 
these collective lending methods may appeal to international shareholders. We therefore formulate 
hypothesis as follows: 
H4: MFIs that have international shareholders often adopt collective lending methods. 
 
3.3.2 International shareholding, MFI financial performance and operating cost 
International private equity investors invest in specialized investment funds called Microfinance 
Investment Vehicles (MIVs) “which then channel the invested funds to MFIs” (Lützenkirchen et 
al., 2012, p. 8). In a way, these MIVs are serving as specialized capital markets for the 
microfinance industry (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). According to Wiesner & Quien, (2010), 
MIVs invest in regularly regulated, and monitored MFIs that are performing well, both financially 
and socially. MIVs therefore concentrate in finding MFIs that are financially sound and operate in 
efficient ways (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013; Wiesner & Quien, 2010). MIVs also appear to seek 
both financial and social returns from their investment in MFIs (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). In 
addition, the presence of international shareholders can also promote performance through the 
introduction of governance enhancing mechanisms such as board independence (Hartarska, 2005; 
Mori et al., 2015) and effective monitoring of the management team through formal and informal 
means (Ahmadjian, 2007). In the event of this happening, the board becomes effective in executing 
their supervisory and monitoring role and hence a reduction in agency cost which can subsequently 
improve performance as managers are less likely to engage in expropriation and other self-seeking 
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ventures. From the perspective of resource based theory, international shareholders may serve as 
important access to capital and other valuable resources which enhance performance. These 
shareholders can be good monitors who possess governance enhancing knowledge and skills. 
Evidence in literature suggests that foreign ownership is related to quality loan portfolios and 
implementation of aggressive approaches to guard against deterioration of portfolio quality 
(Crystal et al., 2002). This could lead to lower default cost and higher profitability. Also, anchoring 
on the findings of Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009), one could reasonably expect that the 
international shareholder variable would be related to lower operating costs. Based on these, we 
argue that MFIs that have international shareholders may outperform their counterparts who do 
not have international shareholders. 
On the other hand, internationalization is often impacted by liability of foreignness and foreign 
investors are affected by the same (Baik et al., 2013; Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). Being 
international shareholders, it is logical for them to elect or agitate for the election of an 
international board member to represent their interest (Berger et al., 2009). But in the microfinance 
literature, the presence of international directors is often not associated with good performance 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mersland et al., 2011; Masulis et al., 2012). Liability of foreignness 
could be a possible explanation for this relationship. For example Mersland & Strøm (2009) and 
Mersland et al. (2011) note that international directors could represent a cost factor as they are 
likely to bring on board a costly culture hence negatively affecting performance. Lensink et al. 
(2008) find that foreign ownership impacts negatively on the efficiency of banks. They provide 
evidence to the effect that such negative impact is the result of difficulty in dealing with 
“regulations, banking supervision rules, local judiciary in general, and corruption” (Lensink et al., 
2008, p. 841). This is an obvious manifestation of liability of foreignness. According to literature, 
liability of foreignness manifests as additional costs and often negatively affects performance. In 
sum, the empirical findings and theories explored predict opposite outcome. Therefore, putting all 
together, we formulate alternative hypotheses as follows: 
H5a: The presence of international shareholders in an MFI positively influences overall financial 
performance.  
H5b: The presence of international shareholders in an MFI negatively influences overall financial 
performance. 
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H6a: The presence of international shareholders reduces operating cost 
H6b: The presence of international shareholders increases operating cost 
 
3.4 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we present the conceptual framework for this study. This is based on the 
relationships established by the hypotheses. The framework is shown in figure 3.1 below: 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
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3.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the main theories that underpin this thesis. These include agency 
theory, resource based theory and liability of foreignness. We also presented the findings of prior 
research in the microfinance and banking industry as well as from other related fields. The findings 
of previous research suggest that foreign or international ownership influence performance. The 
research hypotheses were also formulated.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we describe the data for this research. We mention the validity and 
representativeness of the data and outline the country of origin of each MFI.  
 
4.1 Data source and Sample Description 
Data can be obtained from two main sources, primary or secondary sources. Sekaran & Bougie 
(2013, p. 113) define these two sources as follows: “Primary data refers to information obtained 
first-hand by the researcher on the variables of interest for the specific purpose of the study. On 
the other hand, secondary data refer to information gathered from sources that already exist”. 
The data based on which we carry this research is secondary in nature. It is generated from risk 
assessment reports prepared by five rating agencies i.e. MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, 
Crisil and M-Cril. The reports are from 1998 to 2012 with the majority from 2004 to 2008. The 
source of information for this study is vital as the data has to be reliable and relevant for our study. 
For the purpose of this study, only shareholder firms (SHFs), made up of, Bank and Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions are considered since only MFIs that issue out shares are of interest. These 
agencies clearly categorize the MFIs along several aspects including legal structure and whether 
the MFIs have an international shareholder or not. The five rating agencies are endowed with much 
information as they are the largest players in the Microfinance industry. We deem this information, 
coming from third party independent rating agencies that are officially approved by the Rating 
Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP), as reliable and high in quality. 
The dataset employed contains 148 Microfinance Institutions in 51 countries globally. Table 4.1 
below shows countries with their corresponding number of MFIs grouped under different regions 
and in accordance with the categorization by microfinanzarating.org (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South-East Asia & the Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, Middle 
East & North Africa, and Industrialized countries). It can be seen that Peru has the largest number 
of MFIs represented in this study. However, generally, Africa is the most represented region with 
47 MFIs and Middle East and North Africa is the lowest with 4 MFIs as displayed in figure 4.1. 
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Since only rated MFIs are included in the dataset, there could be a sample selection bias. However, 
we believe this to be minimal owing to the fact that this data is not self-reported.  
Country specific data are obtained from other sources. Data on GDP per capita, GDP growth and 
inflation for the respective years are obtained from the World Bank group database1. The current 
account balances for the respective countries and years are obtained from the World Economic 
Outlook database developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)2. Heritage index, which 
measures the level of economic freedom of countries where the MFIs operate is obtained from the 
website of The Heritage Foundation3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
2 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/download.aspx 
3 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
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Table 4.1: List of countries, categorized according to region, with their corresponding 
number of Microfinance Institutions.  
Region Country 
Number 
of MFIs 
 
Region Country 
Number 
of MFIs 
Africa 
Benin 1  
Europe and 
Central Asia 
Afghanistan 1 
Burkina Faso 1  Albania 1 
Cameroon 3  Armenia 2 
Ethiopia 10  Azerbaijan 7 
Guinea 1  Bosnia 1 
Kenya 6  Georgia 3 
Madagascar 2  Kazakhstan 3 
Mozambique 1  Kosovo 2 
Niger 2  Kyrgyzstan 3 
Rwanda 3  Moldova 2 
Senegal  2  Montenegro 1 
Tanzania 5  Romania 1 
Uganda 8 
 Russian 
Federation 1 
Zambia 2  Tajikistan 4 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina 1  
South-East 
Asia and the 
Pacific 
Cambodia  13 
Bolivia 2  China 4 
Brazil 1  East Timor 1 
Chile 1  India 2 
Colombia 1  Mongolia 3 
Dominican 
Republic 1 
 
Nepal 3 
El Salvador 3  Philippines 1 
Haiti 1  Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
Jordan 3 
Honduras 2 
 
Lebanon 1 
Mexico 7     
Nicaragua 1     
Paraguay 1     
Peru 15     
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of MFIs by region 
 
 
4.2 Representativeness of the data 
Due to the highly diversified nature of the microfinance industry, typically, no dataset perfectly 
represents all MFIs in the industry (Mersland & Strøm, 2012a; Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). The 
dataset based on which we carry out this research is no exception to this. However, since, the data 
is collected by rating agencies (third parties), the information content is richer and reliable. In 
addition, data on microfinance collected by rating agencies have proved to be quality over the 
years and many studies based on such data have been published in prominent international 
journals. Some of these studies are found in the list of references. 
 
4.3 Summary characteristics of the MFIs in the dataset 
In the dataset, 53% of the MFIs have international shareholders. The remaining 47% are locally 
owned and hence have no international shareholders. This gives an indication of rising equity 
investment in shareholder MFIs. In table 4.2, we present the list of international shareholders in 
the microfinance industry that are contained in the dataset. As could be seen from the table, most 
of the international shareholders originate from developed countries. This could mean that MFIs 
usually look to the “developed North” for funding solutions. The average age of MFIs in the dataset 
is approximately 9 years and the minimum and maximum ages are 0 and 79 respectively. Also, the 
mean value of assets of an MFI is US$14,886,383. The minimum and maximum assets values are 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Middle East & North Africa
South-East Asia & the Pacific
 Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
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US$50,000 and US$279,350,811 respectively. The minimum and maximum values of age and 
assets show a wide diversity. Mersland & Strøm (2012a) explain that such diversity is due to the 
young nature of the industry and the fact that MFI are at different stages of development and are 
also domestically established in diverse contexts. Also in the dataset, 67% of the MFIs are 
regulated by banking authorities in the countries in which they operate and 30% focus on women 
clients. 65% and 19% of the MFIs use solidarity group lending and village banking credit 
methodologies respectively. Regarding capital structure, the average debt to equity ratio is 3.7. 
MFIs in the dataset therefore employ both debt and equity financing. Detailed descriptive statistics 
and discussion of the characteristics of the MFIs is presented in chapter 6 (under section 6.1). 
Table 4.2 List of international shareholders in the dataset and their corresponding 
countries of origin 
 Name  Country  Name Country 
 Accion Gateway Fund United States  Oikocredit Netherlands, The 
ACCION Investments Cayman Islands  OTI United States 
AfriCap Mauritius  ShoreCap Intl. United Kingdom 
CAF Venezuela  SIDI France 
Citigroup Foundation United States  Triodos-Doen Foundation Netherlands, The 
CRESUD Italy  LaCif Panama 
DBMDF United States  Grameen Trust Bangladesh 
FMO Netherlands, The  WWB United States 
Hivos Netherlands, The  Triple Jump  Netherlands, The 
I&P Developpement France  Blue Orchard Switzerland 
IFC United States  World Vision/Vision Fund United States 
Impulse (Incofin) Belgium  KIVA United States 
INCOFIN Belgium  Stromme Microfinance Norway 
KEF South Africa  Shore Bank  
KFW Germany  Locfund  
Kolibri Kapital ASA Norway  Other  
NOVIB Netherlands, The    
 
4.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we described the data based on which we carry out this research. The data is from 
148 MFIs from 51 countries. This consists of two independent samples, shareholder MFIs that 
have international shareholders and shareholder MFIs that do not have international shareholders.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter we present the research methodology. Thus we document the various techniques, 
methods and procedures we employ in analyzing the data. The methods carefully discussed here 
serve as the blueprint for the measurement of the concepts and the analysis of the data based on 
which we answer the research questions of this thesis (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013).   
 
5.1 Operationalization and measurement of concepts 
Operationalization is “the process of identifying the actual measurement scales to assess the 
variables of interest” (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2012). For constructs that cannot be 
directly observed and measured, researchers usually combine several items to aid their 
measurement (Sarstedt & Mooi, 2014). This is the process of operationalization.  According to 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013, p. 200), operationalization “is done by looking at the behavioural 
dimensions, facets, or properties denoted by the concept which are then translated into observable 
and measureable elements so as to develop an index of measurement of the concept”.   
In this study, the main concepts include; international shareholder, MFI financial performance and 
operating cost. These are operationalized with the aid of variables that are empirically supported.  
 
5.1.1 Independent and dependent variables 
For the analysis meant to answer the first research question, the dependent variable is the dummy 
for international shareholder and the independent variables are the MFI characteristics. Regarding 
the analysis meant to answer the second research question, the dummy for international 
shareholder is the only independent variable. The dependent variables are the proxies for overall 
financial performance (sub-divided into overall efficiency and profitability) and operating cost. 
The proxies for overall financial performance include, return on equity (ROE) (Lin & Zhang, 2009: 
Bonin et al., 2005) and ratio of cost to income (Lin & Zhang, 2009) for profitability and efficiency 
respectively. The proxy for operating cost is the ratio of operating cost to assets (D’espallier et al., 
2011). 
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5.1.2 Control variables 
We control for country, regional and MFI specific effects as previous microfinance studies do 
(Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Hartarska, 2005). In this study, we include same 
controls as in Mersland et al. (2011). Additionally, we control for the effects of capital structure in 
our analysis. The control variables are sub-categorized into MFI specific controls, country specific 
controls and regional controls. The MFI specific controls are, age, size (total of assets), portfolio 
at risk and debt to equity ratio. The country specific controls are GDP per capita (adjusted for 
effects of purchasing power parity), GDP growth, inflation, current account balance and heritage 
index of the country. The regional controls are as follows: dummy variables for Europe and central 
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South East Asia and the Pacific 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
In table 5.1, we explain the dependent and independent variables used in this study. The 
explanations for the control variables are shown in table 5.2. In table 5.3 the independent variable 
and its expected effect on the dependent variables are presented. The expected relationships 
between the MFI characteristics and the international shareholder variable are also displayed in 
the same table. 
 
Table 5.1: Explanation of independent and dependent variables 
Variable Explanation/Measure 
General and financial performance variables 
International 
shareholder 
Dummy variable with value of (1) if the MFI has an international 
shareholder and value of (0) if the MFI has no international 
shareholder 
Cost to income Operating expense divided by total financial revenue 
Operating expense to 
assets 
Total operating expense / Total assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
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Organizational variables 
Credit clients Number of credit clients 
Bank regulation Dummy variable with a value of (1) if the MFI is regulated by banking 
authorities and value of (0) if the MFI is not regulated 
Urban market A dummy variable with a value of (1) if the MFI has an urban focus 
and value of (0) if the MFI has a rural focus. 
Female bias A dummy with the value of (1) if the MFI has a female bias and (0) if 
otherwise 
Lending methodology 
Group lending Dummy variable with value of (1) if the MFI offers solidarity group 
loans and value of (0) if not 
Village banking Dummy variable with value of (1) if the MFI offers village banking 
and value of (0) if not 
International variables 
International network 
member 
Dummy variable with a value of (1) if the MFI is a member of an 
international network and value of (0) if otherwise  
International CEO Dummy variable with a value of (1) if the MFI has an international 
CEO and value of (0) if otherwise 
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Table 5.2 Organizational and contextual control variables 
Variable Explanation/Measure 
MFI specific controls 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets of the MFI 
Age Number of years since the MFI was established to the year in which 
the data was collected 
Portfolio at risk share of outstanding loan portfolio with more than 30 days in arrears 
Debt to equity ratio Total debt +  total savings
Total equity
 
Contextual controls 
Country specific controls 
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country adjusted for effects of purchasing power 
parity (PPP) 
GDP growth  The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency 
Inflation Annual percentage of inflation measured by consumer price index 
Current account 
balance 
Current account balance of the country as a percentage of GDP 
Heritage index Measure of economic freedom in a country as published by the 
heritage foundation 
Regional controls 
Europe and central 
Asia (ECA) 
Dummy variable with value of (1) for countries from Europe and 
central Asia and (0) for otherwise 
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Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) 
Dummy variable with value of (1) for countries from Latin America 
and Caribbean and (0) for otherwise 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 
Dummy variable with value of (1) for countries from Middle East and 
North Africa and (0) for otherwise 
South East Asia and 
the Pacific (SEAP) 
Dummy variable with value of (1) for countries from South East Asia 
and the Pacific and (0) for otherwise 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) 
Dummy variable with value of (1) for countries from Sub-Saharan 
Africa and (0) for otherwise  
 
Table 5.3: Hypothesized relationships between independent and dependent variables 
Variables Hypothesis 
Int shareholder 
MFI characteristics  
Social set-up + 
Regulation + 
International orientation + 
Collective lending method and market + 
Performance variables  
Cost to Income + / - 
ROE + / - 
Operating expenses to assets + / - 
 
5.2 Data analysis techniques 
Beginning the analysis of our data, we generate the descriptive statistics of the data for the purpose 
of familiarizing ourselves with the dataset and to understand the characteristics of the MFIs 
composed in the dataset. According to Fisher & Marshall (2009, p. 93), “descriptive statistics are 
simply the numerical procedures or graphical techniques used to organize and describe the 
characteristics or factors of a given sample”. According to these authors, descriptive statistics 
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provide a useful means of summarizing data and describing a sample and also seem the simplest 
statistical analysis for a researcher to perform.  
To answer the first research question, we perform t-test and nonparametric chi square tests 
(univariate techniques) to compare the mean and median values of MFIs with international 
shareholders and those without international shareholders along the different MFI characteristics 
and performance variables. The aim is to assess whether there is a significant difference between 
MFIs that have international shareholders and those that do not have international shareholders 
and to also identify MFI characteristics that relate to international shareholders. For comparisons 
of this kind, independent samples t-test and nonparametric chi square test are most appropriate 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013; Zikmund et al., 2012). We augment the univariate techniques with 
multivariate logit regression analysis to identify the particular MFI characteristics that relate to 
presence of international shareholders. In this multivariate setting, we control for regional and MFI 
specific effects. The dependent variable here is the dummy variable for international shareholders 
and the MFI characteristics are the independent variables. 
To answer the second research question, we perform multivariate analysis in two steps. First, we 
assess the influence of the international shareholder variable on the overall financial performance. 
We measure overall financial performance in terms of efficiency and profitability. Ratio of cost to 
income and ROE are the proxies for efficiency and profitability respectively.  Next, we proceed to 
investigate the impact of international shareholders on operating costs of MFIs with the ratio of 
operating cost to assets as a proxy for operating cost. 
 
5.3 Panel data 
The dataset for this study is of panel nature. Hsiao (2014, p. 1) defines a panel dataset as “one that 
follows a given sample of individuals (MFIs for the purposes of this study) over time, and thus 
provides multiple observations on each individual in the sample”. This comes with various 
advantages such as being well suited to study changes in individuals over time, providing more 
informative data, more variability, less likelihood of collinearity and more efficiency (Baltagi, 
2008). It also suggests that individuals are heterogeneous which may lead to biases if ignored. 
However, panel data techniques as compared to cross-section or time series techniques, take this 
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into consideration by taking care of such time or individual specific variables. The general panel 
data model as adopted from Greene (2003) is presented below; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖
′𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡……………………………………………..1 
Where; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 Represents the dependent variables, i at time, t 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  Is a vector of explanatory variables  
𝛽 Denotes the vector of coefficients 
𝑧𝑖
′𝛼 Is the individual effect with 𝑧𝑖 containing a constant term and a set of individual or group 
specific variables, which may be observed or unobserved all considered to be constant over time 
t; and  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 Is the idiosyncratic error term. 
 
5.4 Panel data models 
There are several models that lend themselves to the analysis of panel data and these broadly 
include, but are not limited to, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effects and Random 
effects models (Greene, 2003). In this study, we rule out the fixed effects model because it does 
not take into consideration the effect of time-invariant variables as they are wiped out by the 
transformation (Baltagi, 2008). We rule it out considering the fact that the central variable of our 
study, international shareholder, is a dummy variable. Also, some variables for MFI characteristics 
including the regional control variables are dummies which are time-invariant yet relevant for our 
study. Henceforth, we shall continue with a discussion of pooled OLS and the Random Effects 
panel data models in the next section. After, we would look at the choice between the two models 
with regards to the equations for this study. 
 
5.4.1 Pooled OLS 
“The pooled OLS estimator is obtained by stacking the data over i and t into one long regression 
with NT observations”, (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 702) after which OLS is applied. OLS fits 
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a straight line to the data with the aim of producing the least possible total error (Zikmund, 2013). 
Stacking the data therefore implies that pooled OLS disregards the very nature of panel data. From 
equation (1) above, if 𝑧𝑖 is comprised of only the constant term, then OLS produces efficient 
estimates for 𝛼 and 𝛽 co-efficients under certain assumptions.  
Assumptions of Pooled OLS; 
Wooldridge (2010) explains assumptions that relate to the analysis of panel data using the pooled 
OLS method and these are; 
No Multicollinearity. This assumption prohibits the existence of a perfect linear relationship 
among the predictor variables. 
Homoscedasticity. This means that the variance of the error term is constant across time and firms. 
No serial correlation. The error terms across the different time periods should not be correlated 
with each other. 
Contemporaneous exogeneity. It states that the independent variables and the error term for a 
particular time period should not be correlated. 
In addition to these assumptions, there are other assumptions that are general to the least squares 
method which according to Greene (2003) include; 
Linearity. There should be a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
in the model.  
Normal distribution. The residuals from the model should follow a normal distribution. 
 
5.4.2 Random Effects 
Starting from equation (1) above, we noted that 𝑧𝑖 contains a constant term and a set of 
individual or group specific variables, which may be observed or unobserved. If  𝑧𝑖 (the 
individual effect) is unobserved and assumed to be uncorrelated with the included explanatory 
variables, then equation (1) can be rewritten as; (Greene, 2003) 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝐸[𝑧𝑖
′𝛼] + {𝑧𝑖
′𝛼 − 𝐸[𝑧𝑖
′𝛼]} + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                         = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡……….…………….……2 
Where; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  and 𝛽 are defined as before, 
 𝛼 is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity, 
 𝑢𝑖 denotes the firm-specific random heterogeneity and 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the remainder heterogeneity of firm i at time, t. 
Equation 2 is a random effects model estimated by the random effects method. This method 
“specifies that 𝑢𝑖 is a group-specific random element, similar to 𝜀𝑖𝑡 except that for each 
group, there is but a single draw that enters the regression identically in each period” (Greene, 
2003, p. 285). 
Assumptions of the Random Effects model; 
Random effects specifies similar assumptions as pooled OLS in relation to Homoscedasticity, 
Multicollinearity, Serial correlation, Linearity and Normal distribution. However, rather than 
contemporaneous exogeneity, random effects specifies strict exogeneity meaning that the current 
error term is not correlated with the independent variables in every period (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
5.5 Regression Equations 
Here, we present the regression equations based on which we test the research hypotheses. We 
perform multivariate analysis with four regression equations (with all MFI-specific and contextual 
controls). To avoid falling into the dummy variable trap, we drop one category; SEAP (South-East 
Asia and the Pacific) from the regional dummies when performing the regressions. 
i. 𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑀_𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑝_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑀_𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐶𝑟_𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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ii. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑎𝑅30𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
iii. 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑎𝑅30𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
iv. 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑎𝑅30𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡 + (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where; 
Int_shareholder = International shareholder, Cost_Income = Cost to income, ROE = Return on 
Equity, Operexp_assets = Operating expense to Assets, PaR30 = Portfolio at Risk with 30 days in 
arrears, Debt_Equity= Debt to Equity ratio, Int_netw_member=International network member, 
Int_CEO=International CEO, DM_Bank_regul=Bank regulation, Grp_lend=Solidarity Group 
lending, urban_mkt=Urban market, Cr_clients=Credit clients, ECA = Europe & Central Asia, 
LAC = Latin America & the Caribbean, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA = Middle East & 
North Africa. 
 
5.6 The choice between Pooled OLS and the Random Effects methods 
We now turn our attention to testing which of the two methods is more appropriate for our study. 
This involves testing for the presence of time and individual effects based on the OLS residuals. 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) derived the Langrage multiplier test for random effects for this purpose. 
The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no time and individual effects. This means that the 
OLS estimators are consistent and hence suggesting that pooled OLS is the most appropriate 
method. The null hypothesis is rejected if the test result indicates the presence of time and 
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individual effects. Random effects is the most appropriate method when the null hypothesis is 
rejected. 
We perform this test using the xttest0 command in Stata. The results are shown in table 5.2 below: 
 
Table 5.4: Result for Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects 
Regression equation Dependent variable χ2-statistic p-value 
ii. Cost_Income  216.78 0.0000 
iii. ROE 14.61 0.0001 
vi. Operexp_Assets 382.14 0.0000 
 
From the results displayed in the table above, we reject the null hypothesis for each of the models 
tested and conclude that there is time and individual effects (panel effects). Hence, random effects 
method is the most appropriate for our study. However, we would present pooled OLS results also 
for each model for the purpose of comparison and checking robustness of results. We proceed to 
test the assumptions for random effects as discussed in section 5.4.2. 
 
5.7 Test of assumptions 
Here, we test for the assumptions required by the random effects method. These include test for 
normal distribution of the disturbances, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and 
strict exogeneity.  
 
5.7.1 Normal distribution of the disturbances 
We test for this assumption using normal probability plots (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
All the other variables save for cost to income, total assets, average loan outstanding, credit clients, 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted), PaR30 and operating cost to assets are approximately normally 
distributed. We transform PaR30 by obtaining its square root while all the other variables that are 
not normally distributed are transformed by taking their natural logarithms. The transformed 
variables are shown in appendix II. 
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5.7.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity could be a problem when there is perfect or very high correlation between the 
independent variables. Multicollinearity poses difficulties in estimating the parameters with high 
precision level. Coefficients of the independent variable may be indeterminate and standard errors 
may be too high or even infinite (Gujarati, 2003). To test for this assumption, we generate a 
correlation matrix for the predictor (independent) variables. The correlation matrix and the 
corresponding Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for the independent variables in equation (i) are 
presented in appendix IV. The correlation matrix for equations II, III and IV is shown in table 5.3 
below.  
 
Table 5.5: Correlation matrix 
 
         SSA    -0.0175   0.2469  -0.1951  -0.3460  -0.4288  -0.1454   1.0000 
        MENA    -0.0122  -0.0998  -0.0652  -0.1057  -0.1310   1.0000 
         LAC    -0.2833  -0.2879   0.1776  -0.3116   1.0000 
         ECA     0.2557   0.0931  -0.0055   1.0000 
Current_ac~t     0.1952  -0.1288   1.0000 
   Inflation     0.1754   1.0000 
  GDP_growth     1.0000 
                                                                             
               GDP_gr~h Inflat~n Curren~t      ECA      LAC     MENA      SSA
         SSA    -0.0781   0.0130  -0.2336   0.1158  -0.1457  -0.7338  -0.3215 
        MENA     0.0222  -0.0310  -0.0126  -0.1153  -0.1170   0.2337   0.1787 
         LAC    -0.1535   0.0553   0.2399   0.2607   0.2191   0.5148   0.4847 
         ECA     0.2632  -0.1392  -0.0497  -0.2179  -0.0065   0.2855  -0.1010 
Current_ac~t     0.0139   0.0593   0.1832  -0.0024   0.0738   0.2420  -0.0236 
   Inflation    -0.1044   0.0195  -0.1297  -0.0607  -0.0779  -0.2514  -0.3653 
  GDP_growth     0.0606   0.0006  -0.0969  -0.1906  -0.1118   0.0082  -0.2809 
    Heritage    -0.0038   0.0253   0.1459   0.1953   0.1159   0.4658   1.0000 
  GDP_capita     0.0491   0.0273   0.2600   0.0298   0.1225   1.0000 
 Debt_Equity    -0.0321   0.1114   0.3200   0.1749   1.0000 
       PaR30    -0.1395   0.0850  -0.0018   1.0000 
        Size     0.0673   0.4552   1.0000 
         Age    -0.0630   1.0000 
Int_shareh~r     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Int_sh~r      Age     Size    PaR30 Debt_E~y GDP_ca~a Heritage
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According to Hair et al. (2010), the threshold value to indicate the presence of multicollinearity is 
0.9. Therefore, correlation values of greater than 0.9 indicate the presence of multicollinearity 
whiles values less than 0.9 indicate absence of multicollinearity. From the correlation matrix 
above, the highest value is 0.5148 (correlation between LAC and GDP per capita). None of the 
values is therefore 0.9 or above 0.9 and hence showing the absence of multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. We complement this by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of 
each independent variable and comparing the calculated value with the rule of thumb value of 5. 
The calculated VIF and the corresponding tolerance values are shown in appendix 1. Zikmund et 
al. (2012) suggest that VIF values of greater than 5 indicate the presence of the multicollinearity 
problem.  From the calculated VIFs shown in appendix 1, all the values are below 5 with the 
highest being 4.15 (GDP per capita). This again shows that multicollinearity is absent.  
 
5.7.3 Test for heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is present in a linear model when the disturbances have unequal spread or 
variance (Gujarati 2003). According to this author, heteroscedasticity when not corrected results 
in inefficient estimates. Baltagi (2008) adds that the standard errors of such estimates will be 
biased. We test for this assumption using the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity in Stata. The null hypothesis for this test is that there is constant variance. The 
results of the test are reported in table 5.4 below. In the table, all p-values in bold indicate presence 
of heteroscedasticity hence we reject the null hypotheses for those models. Consequently, we 
perform the regressions using robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity as suggested 
by literature (Baltagi, 2008) 
 
Table 5.6: Results for the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 
Regression 
equations 
Dependent variable χ2-statistic p-value 
i.  Int_shareholder 3.99 0.0457 
ii.  Cost_Income 55.24 0.0000 
iii.  ROE 594.38 0.0000 
iv.  Operexp_assets 2.42 0.1199 
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5.7.4 Test for autocorrelation  
Autocorrelation occurs when the error terms in a regression model are not independent of each 
other. It behaves in a manner similar to heteroscedasticity with regards to the estimates and 
standard errors as it leads to inefficient estimates and biased standard errors (Baltagi, 2008). We 
test for this assumption using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data with the 
command “xtserial” in Stata. The results are shown in table 5.5 below. From the table most of the 
equations in our study suffer from autocorrelation. The equations which have their p-values in bold 
signify presence of autocorrelation. To correct for this, we perform the regressions using robust 
standard errors as suggested by Baltagi (2008). 
 
Table 5.7: Results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
Regression 
equations 
Dependent variable F-statistic p-value 
i.  Int_shareholder 0.01 0.9167 
ii.  Cost_Income 35.67 0.0000 
iii.  ROE 9.48 0.0027 
iv.  Operexp_assets 27.32 0.0000 
 
5.7.5 Test for endogeneity 
Previous findings in the banking literature suggest that well-performing banks could attract 
international equity investors. In the global microfinance industry, it is likely that international 
shareholders would be attracted towards MFIs that are already showing good financial results. In 
such a case, we would be confronted with the problem of endogeneity. We test for endogeneity 
using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity using the two-stage least squares instrumental 
variable method. Generally, finding a good and perfect instrument is an onerous task. Therefore, 
following existing literature, we use the lagged values of the explanatory variable as an instrument 
(Lee, 2014; Owen & Yu, 2008; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). The result of the test is shown 
in table 5.6 below: 
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Table 5.8: Results for Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity 
  Durbin Wu-Hausman 
Regression 
equation 
Dependent 
variable 
χ2-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
ii. Cost_income 0.0038 0.9510 0. 0036 0.9520 
iii. ROE 0.8024 0.3704 0.7723 0.3800 
iv. operexp_assets 0.4748 0.4908 0 .4565 0.4997 
 
From the results displayed in the table, none of the p-values of the Durbin chi square statistic and 
the Wu-Hausman F-statistic is significant at any level. We therefore conclude that none of our 
models suffer from the endogeneity problem. Hence, we would perform the regression analysis 
without using any instrument. However, later, we would employ the instrumental variable 
approach (where we use the instrument) to perform the analysis in order to check the robustness 
of the results.  
 
5.8 Robustness checks 
For the purpose of ensuring that our results are robust we perform further analysis. We do this by 
employing the instrumental variable approach. Thus, we perform the regression analysis using the 
instrument described in sub-section 5.7.5 above. 
 
5.9 Statistical package  
We carry out all tests and analysis of the data using version 14 of the Stata statistical software. 
This software is widely acknowledged and used in quantitative studies – especially those that 
involve the use of panel data such as ours. Given the large volume of study resources available on 
the internet, it is also quite easy to use and get accustomed to. 
 
5.10 Chapter summary 
In this chapter we described the operationalization of the concepts and the statistical techniques 
employed to analyze the data. These include two univariate techniques: t-test and nonparametric 
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χ2-test. We also employ three multivariate regression techniques which include logit regression, 
random effect and pooled OLS. We use Stata statistical software to analyze the data. In the next 
chapter, we present the results of the statistical analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
6.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the results of the statistical techniques applied in analyzing the data. 
We first present the descriptive statistics in table 6.1. We answer the first research question with 
the results of the t-test, nonparametric χ2-test and logit regression. These results are presented in 
table 6.2, table 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. We answer the second research question with the results 
of pooled OLS and random effects.  
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our aim here is to show the general characteristics of the MFIs in the dataset. The descriptive 
statistics of the data are presented in table 6.1 below: 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Main and performance variables 
Int_shareholder 682 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Cost_income 656 0.84 1.38 0.15 30.08 
ROE 623 0.03 0.50 -5.72 3.17 
Operexp_assets 562 0.21 0.14 0.02 1.00 
International orientation 
Int_CEO 610 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Int_netw_member 671 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Lending methodology and market 
Grp_lend 675 0.65 0.48 0 1 
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DM_village_bank 661 0.19 0.39 0 1 
urban_mkt 659 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Organizational variables  
DM_bank_regul 633 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Cr_clients 646 19,985.41  33,558.59  10 394,374.00  
Female_bias 633 0.30 0.46 0 1 
MFI specific controls 
Age 682 8.37 6.05 0 79 
Size 677 14,886,383.97  28,070,449.91  50,000.00  279,350,811.00  
PaR30 623 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.82 
Debt_Equity 639 3.70 7.92 -6.98 105.54 
Contextual controls 
Heritage 668 59.27 5.88 43.50 77.80 
GDP/capita 658 4,833.84  4,237.79  200.00 23,287.91  
GDP_growth 682 6.80 5.45 -14.15 34.50 
Inflation 595 6.83 6.19 -8.24 44.39 
Current_account 681 -3.58 8.35 -29.82 36.77 
ECA 682 0.20 0.40 0 1 
LAC 682 0.28 0.45 0 1 
MENA 682 0.04 0.20 0 1 
SEAP 682 0.13 0.34 0 1 
SSA 682 0.32 0.47 0 1 
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From the table above, 53% of the MFs in the dataset have international shareholders. Regarding 
the financial variables, the average ratio of cost to income is 0.84 with the highest and lowest 
values being 0.15 and 30.08 respectively. This signals that on average, the MFIs in the dataset are 
unable to generate incomes to cover their operating cost. The mean ROE and ratio of operating 
cost to assets are 3% and 0.21 respectively. Also in the table, 12% of the MFIs have international 
CEOs and 36% are members of an international network. 65% of the MFIs use group lending 
methodology whiles 19% use village banking methodology. Solidarity group lending is therefore 
a popular lending methodology among the MFIs in the dataset. 67% of the MFIs are regulated by 
banking authorities in the countries in which they operate. This is high but not surprising as the 
MFIs in the dataset for this thesis are banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs). These 
groups of MFIs are usually more regulated that other types of MFIs. The means for credit clients 
and average loan outstanding are 19,985.41 and $1,452.93 respectively. 30% of the MFIs focus on 
female clients. Turning to the MFI specific controls, the average value of assets held by MFIs in 
the dataset is US$14,886,384 whiles the average age of MFIs is approximately 9 years. This 
suggests that the microfinance industry is fairly young and relatively small in size. The average 
portfolio at risk is 0.05 while that of debt to equity ratio is 3.7. This suggests that the MFIs in the 
dataset often subscribe to debt financing over equity. The statistics also suggest that MFIs operate 
in high growth economies (approximately 7% GDP growth rate) that have slightly above-average 
economic freedom (heritage value of 59.27). The average inflation in all is countries is 6.19% and 
the average capital account balance is $-3.58. The means for the regional dummies give an 
indication that most of the MFIs in the data are operating in Sub-Saharan Africa whiles few are 
operating in the Middle East and North Africa. Largely, the characteristics of the MFIs in the 
dataset mimic the typical characteristics of MFIs explored in section 3.2.1. 
 
6.2 International shareholder and MFI characteristics 
We identify the MFI characteristics that relate to the presence of an international shareholder by 
carrying out two univariate tests - the t-test and nonparametric χ2-test, and logit regression analysis. 
The results of the respective analysis are shown and discussed in turns in the subsections below; 
first, the results of the t-test, then the results of the results of the nonparametric χ2-test and finally 
that of the logit regression analysis.  
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6.2.1 Results of the t-test 
The t-test compares the means of the two independent samples of MFIs, (those that have 
international shareholders and those that do not have international shareholders) that consist of the 
dataset along the various variables. The aim is to assess if there are significant differences between 
the two samples. The null hypothesis for this test is that there are no significant differences between 
the samples.  The results of the t-test is presented in table 6.2 below. “Yes” is for MFIs that have 
international shareholders and “No” is for MFIs that do not have international shareholders. 
 
Table 6.2: Results of the t-test 
 Means   
Variable Yes No t-statistic p-value 
Cost_income 0.3370 -0.4601 -2.9607 0.0032*** 
ROE -0.0327 0.1090 3.5651 0.0004*** 
Operexp_assets -1.6501 -1.8484 -4.0708 0.0001*** 
Cr_clients 9.1650 8.8142 -2.9923 0.0029*** 
DM_village_bank 0.2328 0.1342 -3.2728 0.0011*** 
Grp_lend 0.6639 0.6258 -1.0319 0.3025 
DM_bank_regul 0.6687 0.6811 0.3317 0.7402 
urban_mkt 0.3711 0.2549 -3.2171 0.0014*** 
Female_bias 0.3216 0.2680 -1.4709 0.1418 
Int_netw_member 0.4945 0.2019 -8.2392 0.0000*** 
Int_CEO 0.2340 0.0067 -9.0915 0.0000*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
From the table above, there are statistically significant univariate differences between MFIs that 
have international shareholders and those that do not have international shareholders when it 
comes to most of the characteristics and performance proxies used in this study. MFIs that have 
international shareholders often offer their services through village banking lending methodology. 
These MFIs also tend to have higher number of credit clients and serve a larger proportion of urban 
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markets as compared to their counterparts that do not have international shareholders. In terms of 
international orientation, MFI that have international shareholders usually have an international 
CEO and are often affiliated to an international network. Therefore, MFIs that have international 
shareholders also often have good international orientation.  Largely, these findings are according 
to our expectation. 
Regarding the financial performance indicators explored, MFIs that have international 
shareholders have significantly higher cost to income ratio, lower return on equity and higher 
operating cost to asset ratio compared to those that do not have international shareholders. This 
agrees with hypotheses H5b and H6b respectively. This finding suggests that shareholder MFIs that 
have international shareholders are less efficient, less profitable and often incur higher operating 
cost. We also observe that the mean ROE for MFIs that have international shareholders is -3.27% 
and that MFIs that have no international shareholders is 10.9%. This means that on average, 
international equity investors in the microfinance industry make loses (negative returns) on their 
investment while local investors earn significantly higher financial returns on their investments. 
Most likely, international equity investors in the microfinance industry have similar objectives as 
other international actors in the industry and hence may have more social orientation than financial 
(see Mersland et al., 2011; Mori et al., 2013). We observe no significant univariate differences 
between the two independent samples in terms of using solidarity group lending methodology, 
regulation by banking authorities and targeting of female clients. 
 In the next subsection, we present the results of the nonparametric χ2-test and compare with the 
results of the t-test. 
 
6.2.2 Results of the nonparametric χ2-test 
This χ2-test compares the medians of the two independent samples of MFIs in the data in order to 
assess if there are significant differences between them. The null hypothesis for this test is that 
there are no significant differences in the medians of the independent samples. Table 6.3 presents 
the results of the nonparametric χ2-test. “Yes” is for MFIs that have international shareholders and 
“No” is for MFIs that do not have international shareholders. 
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Table 6.3: Results of the nonparametric χ2-test 
 Median   
Variables Yes No χ2-statistic p-value 
Cost_income -0.4368 -0.4862 1.7725 0.1830 
ROE 0.07 0.10 2.9755 0.0850 
Operexp_assets -1.7113 -1.8326 11.4788 0.0010*** 
Cr_clients 9.2680 8.9341 3.8849 0.0490*** 
DM_village_bank 0.0000 0.0000 10.5720 0.0010*** 
Grp_lend 1.0000 1.0000 1.2215 0.2690 
DM_bank_regul 1.0000 1.0000 0.1854 0.6670 
urban_mkt 0.0000 0.0000 10.2201 0.0010*** 
Female_bias 0.0000 0.0000 2.1631 0.1410 
Int_netw_member 0.0000 0.0000 61.8149 0.0000*** 
Int_CEO 0.0000 0.0000 73.0034 0.0000*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
The results of the nonparametric χ2-test confirms the results of the t-test to a large extent. The 
results indicate that MFIs that have international shareholders have significantly high ratio of 
operating cost to assets compared to their counterparts which do not have international 
shareholders. The ratio of cost to income and ROE which were significant in the t-test are not 
significant in the χ2-test. There are therefore no statistical differences between the medians of these 
performance variables for the two samples. However consistent with the t-test results, MFIs that 
have international shareholders have a lower median for ROE and higher cost to income ratio. The 
median comparison also show that Shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders usually 
use village bank lending methodology, have high number of credit clients and operate often in 
urban markets. They also usually belong to international networks and have an international CEO. 
Consistent with the t-test results, we observe no significant univariate differences between the 
medians of the two independent samples in terms of using solidarity group lending methodology, 
regulation by banking authorities and targeting of female clients. Having presented the results of 
the univariate techniques, we proceed to consider the outcome of the multiple regression analysis.  
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6.2.3 Result of the logit regression analysis 
In this section we extend the examination of the characteristics of MFIs to a multivariate context. 
We perform logit regression analysis with the international shareholder variable being the 
dependent variable whiles the various MFI characteristics are the independent variables. We 
perform the analysis here in two stages. First, we perform the regression without any control and 
later perform with MFI specific and regional controls. The result of the logit regression is shown 
in table 6.4 below. 
 
Table 6.4: Result of the logit regression analysis 
 Int_shareholder Int_shareholder 
Int_CEO 4.538 3.897 
 (4.41)*** (3.76)*** 
Int_netw_member 1.508 1.672 
 (6.07)*** (6.00)*** 
DM_bank_regul -0.015 -0.064 
 (0.06) (0.25) 
Grp_lend -0.205 -0.109 
 (0.80) (0.36) 
urban_mkt 0.640 1.200 
 (2.46)** (3.72)*** 
DM_village_bank 0.874 1.342 
 (2.96)*** (3.78)*** 
Cr_clients 0.217 0.421 
 (2.72)*** (3.10)*** 
Female_bias -0.106 0.141 
 (0.43) (0.51) 
Age  -0.065 
  (2.76)*** 
Size  0.055 
  (0.39) 
ECA  1.144 
  (2.48)** 
LAC  -0.249 
  (0.63) 
MENA  -1.644 
  (2.63)*** 
SSA  -0.840 
  (2.08)** 
_cons -2.811 -5.130 
 (3.92)*** (3.07)*** 
N 495 493 
Pseudo R2  0.22 0.27 
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Wald χ2 75.26*** 115.01*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The results of the logit regression affirms that of the univariate analysis. From the results, all the 
international orientation variables (international CEO and international network member) are 
significantly positively related to the international shareholder variable. This finding is consistent 
with hypothesis H3. Also the results show that shareholder MFIs that have international 
shareholders usually serve urban markets, have larger number of credit clients and reach their 
clients via village banking methodology. With this, we confirm hypotheses H1 and H4 respectively. 
These findings are robust as they still hold even after controlling for MFI specific and regional 
differences. We observe that there is a negative significant relationship between international 
shareholder and age of MFI. This suggests that MFIs that have international shareholders are 
young players in the fast growing microfinance industry. As the case of the univariate analysis 
was, we observe that the international shareholder variable is not significantly related to group 
lending methodology, regulation by banking authorities and targeting of female clients. 
 
6.3 International shareholder and overall financial performance and operating cost 
We turn to present the results for Random effects and pooled OLS multiple regression analysis for 
the overall financial performance and for operating cost in order to answer the second research 
question. We first present the results for the overall assessment of financial performance. As noted 
in the earlier, we assess overall financial performance in terms of efficiency and profitability. Ratio 
of cost to income and ROE are the proxies for efficiency and profitability respectively.  
Table 6.5 presents the results of the overall assessment of financial performance. From the results 
displayed in the table, the international shareholder variable has a significant positive effect on the 
ratio of cost to income. This is consistent with the results of the t-test and hence suggesting that 
MFIs that have international shareholders sell their services and generate their incomes at a higher 
cost. This finding is in line with hypothesis H5b. This finding means that presence of international 
shareholders in MFIs results in inefficiencies. From the table, the relationship is significant at 99% 
confidence level for both pooled OLS and RE estimation methods. The results relating to ROE 
indicate that the international shareholder variable has a significant negative influence on overall 
profitability. This finding confirms the t-test results and also lends support to hypothesis H5b. This 
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result is significant at 99% and 95% in pooled OLS and RE estimation methods respectively. This 
means that MFIs that have international shareholders have poor profitability in terms of ROE as 
compared to their counterparts that have only domestic ownership. Here we extend our argument 
from the univariate analysis that international equity investors in the microfinance industry earn 
very low, negative or no financial returns on their investments.  
Table 6.5: Effect of international shareholding on overall financial performance 
 Cost_income Cost_income ROE ROE 
Int_shareholder 0.132 0.152 -0.111 -0.111 
 (4.02)*** (2.71)*** (3.14)*** (2.51)** 
Age 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.007 
 (0.84) (0.32) (1.68) (1.30) 
Size -0.178 -0.185 0.052 0.066 
 (10.49)*** (5.75)*** (1.51) (1.33) 
PaR30 -0.383 -0.326 -0.263 -0.265 
 (3.11)*** (2.70)*** (1.77) (1.32) 
Debt_Equity -0.050 -0.008 -0.022 -0.088 
 (1.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.37) 
GDP/capita 0.058 0.004 -0.019 -0.021 
 (1.66) (0.08) (0.60) (0.47) 
Heritage -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.91) (0.54) (0.15) (0.15) 
GDP_growth -0.008 -0.005 0.009 0.008 
 (1.70) (1.17) (2.52)** (2.31)** 
Inflation -0.011 -0.006 0.004 0.003 
 (4.30)*** (3.26)*** (2.16)** (1.61) 
Current_account 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.85) (1.23) (0.06) (0.22) 
ECA -0.235 -0.136 0.031 0.031 
 (2.94)*** (1.01) (0.60) (0.42) 
LAC -0.035 0.073 0.090 0.082 
 (0.55) (0.76) (1.77) (1.10) 
MENA 0.090 0.204 -0.294 -0.263 
 (0.92) (1.75) (1.08) (1.08) 
SSA 0.301 0.338 -0.189 -0.207 
 (5.79)*** (3.96)*** (3.58)*** (2.68)*** 
_cons 2.187 2.196 -0.515 -0.692 
 (4.58)*** (3.44)*** (1.15) (1.11) 
R2 0.44 0.42 0.15 0.14 
F/Wald χ2 statistic 17.64*** 172.89*** 7.67*** 51.05*** 
N 497 497 491 491 
Method OLS RE OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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In all, our analysis indicates that the presence of international shareholders negatively affects 
overall financial performance. Other control variables that have significant negative relationships 
with the international shareholder variable in the regression for cost to income are size, portfolio 
at risk and inflation. GDP growth is also significant in the regression for ROE. Next, we regress 
the operating cost on the international shareholder variable. The results are shown in table 6.6.  
Table 6.6: Result for the effect of International shareholding on operating cost 
 Operexp_assets Operexp_assets 
Int_shareholder 0.211 0.245 
 (4.65)*** (2.88)*** 
Age 0.001 0.012 
 (0.27) (2.26)** 
Size -0.187 -0.215 
 (9.64)*** (5.75)*** 
PaR30 -0.796 -0.330 
 (5.59)*** (2.11)** 
Debt_Equity -0.081 -0.100 
 (1.85) (2.63)*** 
GDP/capita 0.191 0.064 
 (3.86)*** (0.85) 
Heritage 0.016 -0.000 
 (2.89)*** (0.03) 
GDP_growth -0.009 -0.002 
 (1.42) (0.38) 
Inflation -0.002 0.003 
 (0.58) (1.64) 
Current_account 0.003 0.004 
 (0.67) (1.05) 
ECA -0.526 -0.232 
 (5.27)*** (1.42) 
LAC -0.091 0.271 
 (1.05) (2.01)** 
MENA -0.203 0.326 
 (1.73) (1.30) 
SSA 0.150 0.129 
 (2.04)** (0.96) 
_cons -1.033 1.012 
 (1.92) (1.37) 
R2 0.32 0.24 
F/Wald χ2 statistic 15.41*** 95.90*** 
N 441 441 
Method OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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From the table above there is a high significant positive relationship between the international 
shareholder variable and the operating cost ratio in both pooled OLS and the RE estimation 
methods.4 This confirms the result of the univariate analysis and lends support to hypothesis H6b. 
This finding suggests that the presence of international shareholders in shareholder MFIs leads to 
significantly high operating costs. In both pooled OLS and RE estimation methods, the relationship 
is significant at 99% confidence level. This result is closely related to the finding observed for the 
influence of international shareholder on ratio of cost to income. The finding therefore calls for 
further probing. On this note, we ask the following legitimate question: what type of cost is 
incurred when an MFI has international shareholders? Could this be administrative cost, personnel 
cost or both? Answers to these questions would provide a useful insight into how the presence of 
international shareholders influence operating cost. Answering these questions, we perform further 
analysis to investigate the particular component of operating cost that is driven up by the presence 
of international shareholders. Stated differently, we examine the nature or type of cost that is highly 
influenced by presence of international shareholders in MFIs. We focus on the two main sub-
categories of operating cost, administrative and personnel costs. We carry out this investigation by 
regressing these components of operating cost on the international shareholder variable. The 
results are shown in table 6.7 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We performed a similar regression analysis (unreported) using ratio of operating cost to portfolio as a proxy for 
operating cost (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). The same results are obtained. 
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Table 6.7: Further analyses of effect of international shareholder on operating cost 
 Admincost_assets Admincost_assets Perscost_assets Perscost_assets 
Int_shareholder 0.282 0.271 0.125 0.202 
 (5.50)*** (2.94)*** (2.66)*** (2.22)** 
Age 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.008 
 (0.55) (0.80) (0.16) (0.54) 
Size -0.235 -0.262 -0.136 -0.180 
 (8.63)*** (6.50)*** (5.91)*** (4.23)*** 
PaR30 -0.343 -0.041 -0.773 -0.243 
 (2.14)** (0.20) (4.58)*** (1.32) 
Debt_Equity -0.054 -0.041 -0.141 -0.120 
 (0.69) (0.42) (2.29)** (2.59)*** 
GDP/capita 0.220 0.208 0.082 0.134 
 (3.90)*** (2.70)*** (1.56) (2.33)** 
Heritage 0.017 0.014 0.018 0.005 
 (2.68)*** (1.51) (2.77)*** (0.58) 
GDP_growth -0.015 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 
 (2.02)** (1.31) (1.56) (2.57)** 
Inflation -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 
 (1.13) (0.57) (0.41) (0.81) 
Current_account -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.008 
 (0.42) (0.31) (0.82) (2.48)** 
ECA -0.587 -0.370 -0.490 -0.316 
 (5.72)*** (2.25)** (4.53)*** (1.78) 
LAC -0.224 -0.043 0.053 0.196 
 (2.36)** (0.27) (0.53) (1.15) 
MENA -0.451 -0.203 0.104 0.468 
 (3.51)*** (1.08) (0.78) (1.60) 
SSA 0.220 0.322 0.017 0.142 
 (2.50)** (2.25)** (0.19) (0.89) 
_cons -1.696 -1.257 -1.730 -1.057 
 (2.72)*** (1.61) (2.93)*** (1.18) 
R2 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.22 
F/Wald χ2 
statistic 
15.24*** 102.84*** 12.65*** 86.15*** 
N 452 452 452 452 
Method OLS RE OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
From the table above, the international shareholder variable has a positive significant relationship 
with both administrative cost and personnel cost. Both pooled OLS and RE estimation methods 
produce significant relationships. That is, the presence of international shareholders in an MFI 
leads to high operating cost in the form of administrative and personnel cost. But is the high 
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operating cost driven by the mere presence of international shareholders or by some other factors 
such as lending methodology or nature of the loans contracted by MFIs that have international 
shareholders. In view of this, we further investigate whether the higher operating cost in MFIs that 
have international shareholders is driven by the mere presence of the international shareholders or 
by nature of the operations and other significant firm specific characteristics. Previous studies find 
that operating cost in MFIs is driven by the nature and type of loans offered by MFIs (D’espallier 
et al., 2011). For example, Mersland & Strøm (2012a) posit that offering of smaller loans is a 
typical characteristic of MFIs and the same is the major reason for high operating cost in MFIs 
since smaller loans are costly to manage. In this regard, we perform additional regression analysis 
and control for the nature of loans contracted by MFIs. In line with literature (D’espallier et al., 
2011), we employ average loan outstanding as a proxy for nature of loan. In this further regression, 
we control for other MFI characteristics (revealed by the univariate and logit regression analysis) 
that show significant differences between MFIs that have international shareholders and those that 
do not have international shareholders. These include lending methodology and international 
orientation. The result of the further regression analysis is presented in table 6.8 below.  
 
Table 6.8: Further regression analysis 
 Operexp_assets Operexp_assets 
Int_shareholder 0.121 0.247 
 (2.16)** (2.31)** 
Av_Loan_out -0.077 -0.048 
 (2.28)** (1.25) 
DM_village_bank 0.131 0.007 
 (1.81) (0.07) 
Int_CEO 0.298 0.156 
 (3.24)*** (1.94) 
Age 0.001 0.014 
 (0.24) (2.14)** 
Size -0.144 -0.196 
 (6.36)*** (4.59)*** 
PaR30 -0.634 -0.286 
 (3.89)*** (1.58) 
Debt_Equity -0.096 -0.141 
 (2.01)** (3.75)*** 
GDP/capita 0.207 0.072 
 (3.63)*** (0.81) 
Heritage 0.014 -0.004 
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 (2.33)** (0.52) 
GDP_growth -0.014 -0.002 
 (1.93) (0.37) 
Inflation -0.004 0.003 
 (0.81) (1.83) 
Current_account 0.001 0.004 
 (0.33) (1.01) 
ECA -0.342 -0.130 
 (3.21)*** (0.76) 
LAC -0.013 0.362 
 (0.16) (2.60)*** 
MENA -0.116 0.368 
 (0.95) (1.36) 
SSA 0.216 0.155 
 (2.54)** (1.02) 
_cons -1.285 1.149 
 (2.17)** (1.37) 
R2 0.35 0.23 
F/Wald χ2 statistic 14.09*** 161.64*** 
N 381 381 
Method OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
After controlling for the effects of nature of loan, lending methodology and international 
orientation, the international shareholder variable still has a positive significant influence on 
operating cost in both pooled OLS and the RE estimation methods’ results. In both estimation 
models also, other MFI characteristics that significantly relate to high operating cost are capital 
structure, age and size of the MFI. Contrary to the findings of D’espallier et al. (2011), we conclude 
that the high operating cost in MFIs that have international shareholders is not due to the nature of 
loans these MFI offer to their clients but by the presence of international shareholders. As revealed 
by the result, additional possible explanations could be capital structure, age and size of the MFIs.  
 
6.4 Check for robustness of the results 
As stated in section 5.8, we check for robustness of the results using instrumental variable 
approach. The instrument used for this regression is the lagged values of the explanatory variable 
(international shareholder). To begin, we check for the robustness of the results relating to the 
influence of the international shareholder variable on overall financial performance. Using both 
OLS and random effects estimation methods, the results are shown in the table presented in 
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appendix V (a). From the result, there is significant positive relationship between the international 
shareholder variable and the ratio of cost to income. The confidence levels are 99% and 95% for the pooled 
OLS and Random effects estimation methods respectively. This is consistent with the earlier univariate and 
multivariate analysis and hence confirms our observation that the presence of international shareholders 
leads to inefficiency in MFIs. We also observe that the international shareholder variable has no significant 
impact on ROE in the random effects estimation method but regarding the pooled OLS method, the 
international shareholder variable negatively affects ROE at 95% confidence level. The results of the pooled 
OLS estimation method is in line with our earlier observations and conclusions drawn but that of the random 
effect method is not. Howbeit, we observe that the sign of the coefficient is negative as before. Also, the p-
value is 0.086 (not reported) which is not too far from significance at 90% confidence level.  
Next, we focus on checking the robustness of the results relating to the effect of the international shareholder 
variable on operating cost. The results of the regression analysis using pooled OLS and Random effect 
estimation methods are presented in the table presented in appendix V (b). 
From the result, both pooled OLS and random effects estimation methods again reveal that the 
presence of international shareholder in MFIs significantly drives up operating costs. This result 
confirms our earlier analysis in both the univariate and the multivariate settings. In view of the 
results we have obtained from the alternative methodology (instrumental variable approach), we 
are persuaded that our findings are robust. 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
We presented the findings in this chapter. We find that MFIs that have international shareholders 
have high international orientation, often use village banking lending methodology and serve more 
credit clients and a large proportion of urban markets. These findings still hold even after 
controlling for regional differences and MFI specific characteristics. These findings are largely 
according to our expectation. On financial performance, we find that having an international 
shareholder has a negative impact on overall financial performance of MFIs in terms of 
profitability and efficiency. Also MFIs that have international shareholders have higher operating 
cost compared to their counterparts with total local ownership. This high operating cost is in the 
form of administrative and personnel costs.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we discuss the findings presented in the previous chapter. We make reference to 
the core theories and previous empirical findings in this detailed discussion.  
 
7.1 International shareholding and MFI characteristics 
The results of the univariate analysis as well as the logit regression analysis reveal that having an 
international shareholder in an MFI is statistically related to five characteristics.  Two of these 
relate to international orientation, one relates to lending methodology and the remaining two are 
characteristics relating to social set-up. We discuss these as follows.  
Firstly, shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders have a high international orientation. 
The results show that these MFIs often have international CEOs and belong to international 
networks. Being members of international networks is highly supported by the resource based 
theory as international shareholders may play a role in securing such affiliations. Again, from a 
resource based view perspective, an international CEO could serve as an important resource due 
to the thin nature of the market for qualified CEOs in the microfinance industry. Further univariate 
analysis (results shown in appendix III) also show that presence of international shareholders is 
significantly related to international directorship and international initiator variables. This agrees 
with the finding of Berger et al. (2009) that international shareholders usually agitate to secure 
board representation. This finding has a phenomenal governance implication. For example, it 
would be relatively easy for these MFIs to successfully adopt improved governance structures and 
align their governance structures to international standards (Oxelheim & Randøy 2003). Generally, 
good corporate governance seems not to be common in the microfinance industry (Hartarska, 
2005) perhaps because MFIs operate in developing countries which are often plagued with poor 
governance. In this regard, internationalization of board and top management positions (E.g. CEO) 
could facilitate the move towards governance reforms in the industry. As an example, 
internationalization of board enhances board independence (Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009) 
which is an essential fabric for good governance in the microfinance industry (Hartarska, 2005) 
and reduction of the agency problem.  Previous research findings also suggest that having an 
66 
 
international initiator and belonging to an international network enhances social performance of 
MFIs (Mersland et al, 2011).   
Secondly, shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders more often use village banking 
lending methodology. This lending methodology is instrumental in reaching out to poorer clients 
and households (D’espallier et al., 2011; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt & Morduch, 2008). This suggests 
that MFIs that have international shareholders have higher outreach and could be more socially 
inclined. In literature, collective lending methods such as village banking is related to high 
repayments and hence lower default costs (D’espallier et al., 2011).  
Finally, the MFIs that have international shareholders usually serve urban markets and have higher 
number of credit clients. The larger client base could be the result of the village banking 
methodology as such collective lending methodology enhances outreach. This implies that these 
MFIs are able to offer many smaller loans to poorer people (D’espallier et al., 2011; Cull et al., 
2008). Since the female bias variable is not significant in both univariate and multivariate setting, 
these smaller loans are offered to both men and women alike.  
In the light of these findings relating to MFI characteristics that relate to the presence of 
international shareholders, we accept hypotheses H1, H3 and H4. 
 
7.2 International shareholders and overall financial performance 
We measure overall financial performance in terms of profitability and efficiency. The results of 
both the univariate and multivariate analysis show that the presence of international shareholders 
has a negative effect on profitability of MFIs in terms of ROE. This finding is consistent with the 
main findings of Lensink & Naaborg (2007) but contrary to findings of Yoshikawa & Phan (2003), 
Berger et al., (2009) and Lin & Zhang (2009). The finding also suggest that international 
shareholders earn little or no returns and sometimes even negative returns on their investment.  
There is however positive significant relationship between the international shareholder variable 
and the ratio of cost to operating income. Stated differently, MFIs that have international 
shareholders are inefficient as they generate their incomes at a higher cost. This relationship is 
consistent in both the univariate and multivariate analysis. This finding is highly supported by 
previous research in the banking industry (Lensink & Naaborg 2007; Berger et al. 2005; Lensink 
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et al. 2008). The findings of Lin & Zhang (2009) however suggest otherwise. Various reasons 
could be responsible for the inefficiencies in MFIs that have international shareholders. A possible 
explanation could be the high governance related cost from agency theory perspective. The result 
of our analysis show that having an international shareholder is significantly related to 
international director and international CEO variables. Meanwhile in microfinance literature, 
international directorship does not enhance financial performance in often cases (Mersland, & 
Strøm, 2009; Mersland et al, 2011; Masulis et al., 2012). Whiles international directors and CEOs 
are likely to be awarded higher remuneration, the ill effect of liability of foreignness could be a 
possible explanation for the inefficiencies. As evident in previous studies, these international 
variables (international shareholder, director and CEO) may represent a cost factor as they are 
likely to bring on board a costly culture (Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mersland et al., 2011). Being 
relatively younger MFIs in the industry, the high cost consequences of liability of foreignness can 
be severe (Lu & Beamish, 2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Zaheer 1995). But since these firms are 
young in a fast growing industry, the performance benefits of having international shareholders 
may be realized in future years (Williams & Nguyen 2005).  
Altogether, we observe that the presence of international shareholders negatively influences 
overall financial performance and hence we reject hypothesis H5a and accept the alternative 
hypothesis H5b. Perhaps just as international commercial debt and general internationalization of 
MFIs, presence of international shareholders may relate to social performance and not financial 
performance (Mersland et al., 2011; Mori et al., 2013). Also, international actors in the 
microfinance industry may be social rather than financially inclined. In the next section, we 
proceed to reflect on the findings related to operating cost. 
 
7.3 International shareholder and operating cost  
We also find that having an international shareholder is significantly related to high operating 
costs. In other words, MFIs that have international shareholders have high operating cost compared 
to their counterparts that have no international shareholders. This is consistent throughout the 
univariate analysis and the different multivariate estimation methods (pooled OLS, random effects 
and instrumental variable methods). Further regression analysis reveals that the high operating cost 
is in the form of administrative and personnel cost. Even after controlling for the nature of loan, 
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lending methodology, international orientation and other MFI-specific characteristics, the 
international shareholder variable still significantly drives up operating cost. The high operating 
cost observed here buttresses the finding related to the ratio of cost to income since high operating 
cost is a reason for inefficiency. This finding is consistent with previous findings in the banking 
industry (Unite & Sullivan, 2003; Lensink & Naaborg, 2007). We however contradict the findings 
of Gulamhussen & Guerreiro (2009). We opine that such high cost could be related to governance 
costs that may have emanated from the ill effects of liability of foreignness. More essentially, the 
findings may imply that international equity investors have the tendency to install the culture of 
incurring higher operating costs and inefficiency in MFIs in which they invest. On the basis of 
these findings, we reject hypothesis H6a and accept the alternative hypothesis H6b. Mersland & 
Strøm (2012a) however assert that high operating cost in MFIs could mean that these MFIs have 
the willingness to serve the poor. These authors also opine that operating cost could be low in later 
years due to learning effects. 
The findings discussed in this chapter are robust and empirically supported. In terms of 
international shareholders and MFI characteristics, we find the findings to be robust as three 
estimation methods (t-test, χ2-test and logit regression) produced same results. Similar is the 
findings relating to the relationship between international shareholding and MFI performance. 
Here also, the results are largely consistent across the univariate and multivariate techniques 
employed (t-test, pooled OLS and random effect). In addition, we observe similar results when we 
checked for the robustness of the results with an alternative methodology (instrumental variable 
approach) in section 6.4.   
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
MFIs that have international shareholders are less profitable and less efficient and often incur 
higher operating cost in the form administrative and personnel costs. These findings are 
theoretically and empirically supported.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.0 Introduction 
The microfinance industry is experiencing rapid growth and financing this growth is a legitimate 
concern. During the past decade, international commercial funding in the form of international 
debt and equity has played a remarkable role in this regard. Projections by industry experts affirm 
the role of international funding in the coming years. Until now, microfinance research that focus 
on the performance implications of international funding of MFIs is inadequate even though the 
microfinance literature is voluminous. Our study focuses on the presence of international 
shareholders in microfinance institutions. We answer two research questions that concern the 
characteristics of shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders and an assessment of the 
influence of international equity on the overall financial performance of MFIs as well as on 
operating cost. We fill literature gap and provide empirical evidence on the characteristics of MFIs 
that have international shareholders and the influence of international equity on the overall 
financial performance of MFIs and operating cost. We employed both univariate and multivariate 
analysis methods to analyze the data.  
 
8.1 Summary of findings and conclusion 
We find that shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders are highly internationally 
oriented as these MFIs more often are affiliated to international networks, have internationalized 
boards, international CEOs and are initiated by international actors. These MFIs also serve more 
urban markets, often use village banking methodology and have a higher outreach in terms of 
number of credit clients. Shareholder MFIs that have international shareholders and those that do 
not have international shareholders have other organizational characteristics in common such as 
focus on women and regulation by banking authorities. We also find that MFIs that have 
international shareholders are less profitable and less efficient in terms of ROE and ratio of cost to 
income respectively. We therefore conclude that the presence of international shareholders has a 
negative influence on overall financial performance of MFIs. In addition, we find that MFIs that 
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have international shareholders have higher operating cost profiles in the form of administrative 
and personnel cost. Our findings are robust and as well, they are empirically and theoretically 
supported.  
 
8.2 Implications  
Our findings have important policy and practical implications for policy makers and international 
equity investors in the microfinance industry. Firstly, MFIs must be aware of the inefficiency and 
high operating cost that may results from having international shareholders. In the same vein, 
international owners in the microfinance industry must be aware and wary of the tendency to install 
the culture of inefficiency and high operating cost in MFIs in which they invest. Secondly, the 
findings also imply that, MFIs could reap benefits from having international shareholders such as 
high international exposure and higher outreach in terms of number of credit clients. However, 
these benefits come at significant cost. This has strong implications for corporate managers to find 
workable schemes to forestall the rising costs. Finally, there is market for social investors and this 
is the microfinance industry. The microfinance industry therefore seems to be a specialized 
industry in which foreign actors do not primarily seek financial returns (which is unlike the 
traditional industries). In effect, it is important for the microfinance industry to be seen and 
perceived differently from traditional ones.  
 
8.3 Limitations of the study 
Our study is not without limitations. The MFIs in our dataset are averagely young in the fast 
growing industry. Our findings should therefore be generalized with caution as performance 
improvements that result from having international shareholders may take time to realize as 
literature suggests. Also the negative effects of liability of foreignness could be less severe in later 
years. 
Secondly, we use only the dummy for international shareholders as the main variable of the study. 
An additional variable such as percentage holding by international shareholding could have 
revealed other influences of international shareholding on MFIs’ financial performance and cost. 
For example international shareholders may be able to exert significant influence only if they 
possess significant percentage of shares. 
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8.4 Recommendations for future studies 
A similar study that introduces an additional explanatory variable, percentage of shares held by 
international shareholders, would be worthwhile. This is because, increasing or decreasing the 
stake of international shareholders in an MFI may have different effects on performance as evident 
in the banking literature.  
It would also be worthy for future research to investigate the effect of having an international 
shareholder on the governance mechanisms of MFIs such as CEO characteristics, board 
membership, executive compensation and auditing related issues. This would provide interesting 
academic and practical insights into how international shareholders impact governance of MFIs.  
The MFIs in the dataset used for this paper are banks and Non-Bank Financial institutions (NBFIs). 
Future research could repeat our study for only banks or NBFIs. The effect of international 
shareholder in the separate charter types could differ. This may perhaps be the case because banks 
are more regulated by banking authorities than NBFIs and hence international shareholders 
influence in banks could be less significant.  
Finally, we recommend future studies to investigate the influence of other ownership types (such 
as large shareholders and public owners) on MFIs’ performance. These studies have been carried 
out in other industries but not the microfinance industry. 
 
8.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we presented the summary of the findings and drew conclusions. We also 
documented the implications of the findings to policy makers and other stakeholders in the 
microfinance industry. Finally, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research were presented. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: VIF result 
Variable VIF Tolerance  
Int_shareholder       1.11    0.8991      
Age  1.28 0.7828 
Size 1.59 0.6271 
PaR30 1.17 0.8558 
Debt_Equity 1.28 0.7814 
GDP/capita 4.15 0.2410 
Heritage 1.83 0.5467 
Current_account  1.27 0.7901 
GDP_growth 1.17 0.8582 
Inflation 1.27 0.7890 
ECA 2.13 0.4696 
LAC 3.65 0.2738 
MENA 1.69 0.5934 
SSA 2.88 0.3466 
Mean VIF  1.89  
 
Appendix II: Transformation of variables 
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Appendix III: Additional t-test result 
 Means   
Variable Yes No t-statistic p-value 
Int_Initiator 0.6366 0.1735 -13.7339 0.0000*** 
Int_Dir 0.9400 0.0432 -41.1629 0.0000*** 
Par30 0.1710 0.2077 3.5112 0.0005*** 
 
Appendix IV Correlation matrix of independent variables in regression equation (i) 
 
 
 
. 
         SSA     0.0730   0.0130  -0.2336  -0.3460  -0.4288  -0.1454   1.0000 
        MENA     0.2710  -0.0310  -0.0126  -0.1057  -0.1310   1.0000 
         LAC    -0.0891   0.0553   0.2399  -0.3116   1.0000 
         ECA    -0.1774  -0.1392  -0.0497   1.0000 
        Size    -0.0924   0.4552   1.0000 
         Age     0.1109   1.0000 
 Female_bias     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Female~s      Age     Size      ECA      LAC     MENA      SSA
         SSA    -0.1011  -0.1255  -0.0062   0.2174  -0.0130   0.2020   0.1106 
        MENA    -0.0836   0.2830  -0.1865   0.0041   0.3148  -0.1024   0.0245 
         LAC    -0.1581  -0.1965  -0.0108  -0.3516   0.1207  -0.1277   0.0378 
         ECA     0.2519   0.1662  -0.0617   0.1097  -0.1248  -0.2198  -0.2912 
        Size    -0.0266   0.0753   0.2855  -0.1816   0.0823  -0.1658   0.6590 
         Age    -0.1253   0.0677   0.1162   0.0944  -0.1851   0.1181   0.4972 
 Female_bias    -0.1145   0.2184  -0.1849   0.0859  -0.0289   0.2080   0.1769 
  Cr_clients    -0.0139   0.1275   0.1980   0.1178  -0.1156   0.1102   1.0000 
DM_village~k    -0.0427   0.0219  -0.0674   0.0281  -0.2564   1.0000 
   urban_mkt     0.0701  -0.0214   0.0626  -0.3125   1.0000 
    Grp_lend     0.0769   0.0894  -0.1534   1.0000 
DM_bank_re~l     0.0078  -0.0517   1.0000 
Int_netw_m~r     0.0576   1.0000 
     Int_CEO     1.0000 
                                                                             
                Int_CEO Int_ne~r DM_ban~l Grp_lend urban_~t DM_vil~k Cr_cli~s
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Corresponding VIF results (equation (i)) 
Variable  VIF Tolerance 
Int_CEO 1.22 0.8215 
Int_netw_member 1.31 0.7635 
DM_bank_regul 1.30 0.7677 
Grp_lend 1.38 0.7269 
urban_mkt 1.73 0.5780 
DM_village_bank 1.38 0.7272 
Cr_clients 3.00 0.3328 
Female_bias 1.40 0.7134 
Age 1.30 0.7682 
Size 3.03 0.3298 
ECA 2.58 0.3870 
LAC 2.82 0.3552 
MENA 2.02 0.4945 
SSA 2.42 0.4133 
Mean VIF 1.92  
 
Note: Model (i) is the regression equation for answering the first research question 
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Appendix V: Results of robustness checks 
Robustness check: international shareholder and overall financial performance 
 Cost_income Cost_income ROE ROE 
Int_shareholder 0.120 0.151 -0.054 -0.051 
 (3.59)*** (2.50)** (2.16)** (1.72) 
Age 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.006 
 (3.05)*** (2.00)** (2.21)** (1.67) 
Size -0.170 -0.177 0.002 0.011 
 (10.46)*** (6.18)*** (0.10) (0.35) 
PaR30 -0.318 -0.269 -0.365 -0.322 
 (2.46)** (2.21)** (2.25)** (1.39) 
Debt_Equity -0.045 -0.031 0.174 0.137 
 (0.85) (0.58) (1.39) (0.81) 
GDP_capita 0.058 -0.031 -0.022 -0.033 
 (1.68) (0.67) (0.87) (1.12) 
Heritage -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.68) (0.39) (0.21) (0.90) 
GDP_growth -0.008 -0.004 0.007 0.007 
 (1.55) (1.09) (1.93) (2.29)** 
Inflation -0.011 -0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (4.09)*** (2.98)*** (2.28)** (2.34)** 
Current_account 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.62) (1.13) (0.65) (0.37) 
ECA -0.248 -0.117 -0.002 -0.003 
 (3.01)*** (0.88) (0.04) (0.05) 
LAC -0.026 0.121 0.080 0.066 
 (0.41) (1.33) (1.88) (1.15) 
MENA 0.073 0.248 -0.014 -0.008 
 (0.77) (2.23)** (0.11) (0.06) 
SSA 0.288 0.280 -0.164 -0.183 
 (5.47)*** (3.39)*** (3.59)*** (2.80)*** 
_cons 1.920 2.315 0.053 -0.170 
 (4.44)*** (4.01)*** (0.13) (0.36) 
R2 0.44 0.42 0.23 0.22 
Wald χ2 statistic 274.71*** 163.78*** 117.29*** 84.06*** 
N 414 414 406 406 
Method OLS RE OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Instrumented:   Int_shareholder 
Instruments:     lagged int_shareholder 
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Robustness check: International shareholder and operating cost 
 Operexp_assets Operexp_assets 
Int_shareholder 0.208 0.269 
 (4.57)*** (2.85)*** 
Age -0.002 0.024 
 (0.39) (2.89)*** 
Size -0.194 -0.243 
 (10.30)*** (6.01)*** 
PaR30 -0.820 -0.380 
 (5.95)*** (2.25)** 
Debt_Equity -0.075 -0.085 
 (1.74) (2.30)** 
GDP_capita 0.234 -0.005 
 (4.80)*** (0.04) 
Heritage 0.018 0.006 
 (3.31)*** (1.00) 
GDP_growth -0.007 0.000 
 (1.14) (0.06) 
Inflation -0.003 0.001 
 (0.84) (0.98) 
Current_account 0.004 0.005 
 (0.95) (1.47) 
ECA -0.584 -0.123 
 (5.87)*** (0.65) 
LAC -0.130 0.328 
 (1.50) (2.37)** 
MENA -0.262 0.437 
 (2.28)** (1.50) 
SSA 0.189 0.109 
 (2.63)*** (0.76) 
_cons -1.392 1.456 
 (2.81)*** (1.65) 
R2 0.36 0.23 
Wald χ2 statistic 242.58*** 99.03*** 
N 402 402 
Method OLS RE 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Instrumented:   Int_shareholder 
Instruments:     lagged int_shareholder 
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APPENDIX VI 
REFLECTIVE NOTE 
1.0 Introduction 
In this reflective note, we first present the findings of this thesis. After, we touch on three issues 
relating to three themes: internationalization, innovation and responsibility. 
 
2.0 Summary of thesis findings 
The general theme of our thesis is the influence of international equity finance on the financial 
performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). In the thesis, we also investigated the particular 
characteristics of MFIS that relate to the presence of international shareholders. After subjecting 
the data to both univariate and multivariate analysis, we found that international ownership in 
MFIs negatively influences overall financial performance in terms of both profitability and 
efficiency. Another striking revelation was that international ownership in MFIs drives up 
operating cost (in terms of both personnel and administrative costs) significantly. Our analysis also 
reveals that MFIs that have international shareholders have high international orientation, they 
often employ village banking lending methodology, have higher outreach in terms of number of 
credit clients and usually serve urban markets. Putting our findings together, we conclude that 
presence of international shareholders worsen the financial performance of MFIs. Also, they may 
install the culture of higher operating cost and other inefficiencies in MFIs in which they invest.  
 
3.0 Internationalization 
In the current global economy, developing countries and charitable concerns are faced with 
competition for donor funds. Stated differently, donations from government, donor organizations 
and philanthropic individuals are highly competed for. The microfinance industry that still 
somehow depends on donations for the financing of their activities is not exception to this 
competition. In the future years, as the microfinance industry grows (in size and number of MFIs), 
demand for international funding including donations would rise since domestics funding sources 
for growth are sometimes inadequate or even unavailable. With increased competition for donor 
funds, MFIs should envisage new expectations from international donors such as increased 
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transparency, efficiency, among others. In this atmosphere, MFIs that are able to distinguish 
themselves in being innovative, creating value for money, operating efficiently and sustainably as 
well as scoring high on transparency would win donor funds. As it has already started, this would 
force many MFIs to turn to the private sector for commercial funding solutions. The impact could 
be an increase in funding cost as commercial funds are not “free”. In our opinion, for MFIs to 
continue to enjoy donor support or attract other cheaper sources of international funding, they must 
operate sustainably and efficiently and be transparent as mentioned before. This could be done by 
embracing the opportunities offered by technology. Our research findings and those of previous 
studies have identified higher operating cost to be a problem of most MFIs especially due to the 
smaller loans they offer to their clients. As evident in the traditional banking industry, employment 
of technological approaches offers enormous opportunities to manage customers in efficient ways. 
Apart from managing customers, internet presence could be a useful tool for harnessing funds from 
lenders. It must be admitted that, adopting contemporary technology by MFIs could be a 
challenging and financial straining task. However, with committed efforts, MFIs would get there. 
Finally, if MFIs lend themselves to auditing by reputable accounting firms, transparency would be 
enhanced to boost investor and donor confidence in the future.  
 
4.0 Innovation 
Microfinance institutions grant smaller loans to poor people (who constitute almost half of the 
world’s population) across the globe. As the findings of our thesis and those of prior studies 
suggest, high operating cost is a problem for most MFIs and a general explanation for this is the 
smaller loans they offer to their customers. Since it is part of their core mandate, MFIs cannot stop 
serving the poor and micro-entrepreneurs with smaller loans. Therefore, innovative means of 
dealing with the high cost would be pragmatic. In our opinion, embracing technology in their 
operations would be an innovative way to arrest the situation. To be more specific, we propose 
internet banking. This has proved successful in the traditional banking industry hence we opine 
that MFIs have more benefits to tap from the same. Of a truth, MFIs focus on the poor who may 
live in remote areas that may not have a good access to electricity than to think about internet 
connectivity. However, not all clients and potential customers are in this situation. Our findings 
even provide evidence that MFIs that have international shareholders often serve urban markets. 
Urban areas usually have good access to electricity and internet. Also, nearly all telecom 
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companies in emerging and developing countries offer internet services to their clients. MFIs could 
therefore clearly segment their market geographically into urban and rural clients. With such 
segmentation, internet banking could be made available to urban clients. This can foster efficiency 
of operations and make MFIs more sustainable.  
 
5.0 Responsibility 
MFIs have been gravely criticized for exploiting the poor. This is due the high interest charged by 
MFIs on loans. It may be unethical to burden poor borrowers with high interests since this increases 
their indebtedness or financial burden and may even make them poorer if they are unable to service 
the loans. In fact, survival of the businesses of micro-entrepreneurs can be threatened by high 
interest rate. It is for these reasons that some view the operations of MFIs as exploitative. 
Meanwhile the reason MFIs charge high interest rates may be due to the problem we mentioned 
in the previous section, high operating cost. The high interest rate may be necessary to cover the 
high operating costs and other costs. In our opinion, if MFIs are able to decrease their operating 
costs significantly, lending rate to their clients would reduce too. A reduction in the lending rate 
presents several advantages to MFIs as well their clients. For example, for MFIs, they would be 
able to attract more clients and reduce risk of default risk. On the other hand, clients would be able 
to service their debts. For these to be possible, operating cost of MFIs would have to be reduced 
first through innovative ways such as the one we have proposed in the previous section. 
 
